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THREE ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Todd Sarnstrom II, Ph.D.
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This three–essay dissertation makes contributions to the literature on foreign direct
investment (FDI) and its relationship with collateral and the exchange rate. FDI refers to an
investment made by a firm to establish or acquire a long–lasting interest in another firm
operating outside its home country. Often, FDI involves substantial fixed costs that require the
investing firm to seek external financing. Collateral has been identified as an important factor in
the external financing of FDI. Firms lacking collateral are constrained in their ability obtain
external financing. Exchange rates have also been identified as a factor in FDI. Exchange rate
movements may create differences in relative wealth between firms headquartered in different
countries.
The first essay studies how the value of collateral pledged to externally financed FDI
varies with how productive firms are. I develop a theoretical model illustrating that more
productive firms are able to pledge a smaller amount of collateral relative to less productive
firms. Additionally, firms with a productivity level below a set threshold level need to pledge
collateral of greater value than the amount borrowed. Firms facing this situation may opt to
instead forego the FDI project. I empirically examine the relationship between pledged collateral
and productivity using firm–level data on Japanese FDI into the U.S. between 1980 and 2000.
My results support an inverse relationship between productivity and pledged collateral implied
by the theoretical model. My results are the strongest for 1991–2000, the period that followed the

burst of Japan’s asset bubble and subsequent collapse of its banking system, which limited the
access Japanese firms had to external financing.
The second essay studies the impact a financial shock has on the amount of controlling
interest (ownership equity) the investing firm has in the foreign affiliate. In particular, I show
how land price shocks in Japan shaped the ownership equity of Japanese foreign affiliates by
analyzing impulse response functions for Japanese foreign direct investment into 12 OECD
countries from 1975 to 2000. A positive shock to land value increased ownership equity in
foreign affiliates belonging to the same 2–digit standard industrial classification as their Japanese
parent by approximately 4–8 percentage points.
The third essay studies the impact exchange rate movements have on foreign direct
investment flows. I use a relatively new empirical technique known as global vector
autoregression (GVAR) to model the interactions between the real exchange rate and U.S.
outward FDI. My results indicate evidence of a statistical relationship between U.S. FDI outflow
and exchange rate movements. However, the actual size of the effect on U.S. FDI outflow is very
small; amounting to much less than 1% of overall FDI received by host countries in the study for
recent years. I conclude that exchange rates did not have an economically meaningful impact on
U.S. FDI outflows during this period
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This three–essay dissertation makes contributions to the literature on foreign direct
investment (FDI) and its relationship with collateral and the exchange rate. FDI refers to an
investment made by a firm in order to establish or acquire a long–lasting interest in another firm
operating outside its home country. The OECD’s (2015) FDI financial flows indicator shows that
world–wide outward FDI was approximately 48 percent lower in 2009 compared to its peak in
2007, and has subsequently struggled to return to its previous levels. This observation has
generated a renewed interest in financial barriers to FDI.
Collateral has been identified as an important factor to externally financing FDI. Often,
FDI involves substantial fixed costs that require the investing firm to seek external financing,
such as a bank loan, to move forward with the FDI project. Firms pledge collateral in the form of
tangible assets, such as land, to secure external financing. Pledged collateral is forfeited to the
lender in the case of default, giving firms incentive to follow through with repayment. Firms
lacking in available collateral are constrained in their ability to obtain external financing.
The first essay offers a different perspective on the relationship between collateral and
FDI. Previous literature focuses on the value of collateral available to the firm, asserting that
firms with more available collateral are less constrained in their ability to externally finance their
FDI projects. 1 Instead, the first essay studies how the value of pledged collateral varies with a
firm’s the productivity level. I develop a theoretical model illustrating that more productive firms
are able to pledge a smaller amount of collateral relative to less productive firms for FDI projects

1

See, for example, Buch et al. (2014), Gan (2007), and Raff et al. (2015).
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requiring the same amount of external financing. Intuitively, more productive firms are safer
investments in the eyes of lenders as their FDI projects are more likely to succeed relative to less
productive firms. This grants more productive firms the ability to pledge less collateral relative
to their less productive counterparts. Additionally, firms with a productivity level below a set
threshold level need to pledge collateral of greater value than the amount borrowed. This may
not be a feasible option for firms facing this situation and cause them to instead forego the FDI
project.
I empirically examine the relationship between pledged collateral and productivity using
firm–level data on Japanese FDI into the U.S. between 1980 and 2000. My results support an
inverse relationship between productivity and pledged collateral implied by my theoretical
model. My results are the strongest for 1991–2000, the period that followed the burst of Japan’s
asset bubble and subsequent collapse of its banking system, which limited the access Japanese
firms had to external financing. My results suggest that the productivity level of a firm is
important in determining the amount of collateral pledged to secure external financing during a
time of financial crisis. A plausible explanation is that in the eyes of lenders more productive
firms are more likely to be successful with their FDI projects, reducing the likelihood of default.
This allows more productive firms to secure external financing with less collateral relative to less
productive firms.
The second essay studies the impact a shock to available collateral has on the amount of
ownership equity parent firms place in their foreign affiliates. Ownership equity refers to the
amount of controlling interest the investing firm has in the foreign affiliate. Japanese
multinational firms were subjected to large financial shocks during the 1980s and 1990s. Land
prices surged during the late 1980s, resulting in a large land price bubble which subsequently
2

collapsed during the early 1990s. Land prices lost approximately half their value during the
1990s, sending Japan into financial crisis. Domestically–held land is also a traditional form of
collateral in Japan’s culture of corporate finance.2 While previous literature, such as Raff et al.
(2015), has studied how collateral affects the amount of outgoing FDI, I instead focus on how
collateral affects the amount of ownership equity parent firms place in their foreign affiliates.
Intuitively, a positive shock to land prices such as the one experienced by Japan during the late
1980s increases the amount of collateral available to firms, thereby increasing their borrowing
capacity. A multinational firm may opt to establish a wholly owned foreign affiliate, as opposed
to sharing ownership with a partner, as a result of increased borrowing capacity. In other words,
increased borrowing capacity may make an investment partner unnecessary by increasing the
feasibility of financing a wholly owned foreign affiliate.
I show how land price shocks in Japan shaped the ownership equity of Japanese foreign
affiliates by analyzing impulse response functions for Japanese foreign direct investment into 12
OECD countries from 1975 to 2000. A positive shock to land value increased ownership equity
in foreign affiliates belonging to the same 2–digit standard industrial classification as their
Japanese parent by approximately 4–8 percentage points. Ownership equity in foreign affiliates
outside the 2–digit standard industrial classification of their Japanese parent does not appear to
be affected by a positive land value shock. This may be due to the fact that non–core affiliates
are likely to require assets and knowledge that the parent may not possess but can easily obtain
through shared ownership of the foreign affiliate.

2

See Gan (2007).
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Exchange rates have also been identified as a factor in FDI.3 Exchange rate movements
may create differences in relative wealth between firms headquartered in different countries.
Firms are more capable of internally financing their FDI projects as the home country’s currency
appreciates due to an increase in their relative wealth. However, there is also evidence that
exchange rates are not an important factor to FDI4 or behave in a uniform manner.5 Perhaps an
intuitive counterargument against the importance of exchange rates in FDI follows from the long
time horizon associated with FDI. It is reasonable to say that it takes considerable time to plan
and establish a foreign affiliate. It is also reasonable to say that once a multinational firm
establishes a foreign affiliate in another country, they are in it for the long haul. Multinational
firms should expect that the exchange rate between home and host country will fluctuate over the
lifetime of the foreign affiliate. Therefore, the exchange rate should not be a critical factor to
multinational firms engaging in FDI.
The third essay studies the impact exchange rate movements have on foreign direct
investment flows using a relatively new empirical technique known as global vector
autoregression (GVAR) to model the interactions between the real exchange rate and U.S.
outward FDI. There are several attractive properties to this approach. First, the dynamics of the
model can be studied via impulse response functions. This not only allows me to see which
direction U.S. FDI moves in response to a change in the real exchange rate, but also the
magnitude of the response in subsequent periods. Second, the model is global in nature. This
allows me to consider many different host countries and economic regions for U.S. FDI around
the world within a single model. Third, the model allows for interactions and feedback between

3

See, for example, Froot and Stein (1991), Klein and Rosengren (1994), and Blonigen (1997).
See Stevens (1993).
5
See Egger et al. (2010).
4

4

the countries and economic regions of the model. This allows me to examine whether or not
changes in the real exchange rate in one country or economic region spread to others around the
world through U.S. outward FDI.

My results indicate evidence of a statistical relationship between U.S. FDI outflow and a
strengthening of the U.S. dollar. However, my results also indicate that an appreciation of the
U.S. dollar relative one country or economic region does not appear to affect U.S. FDI outflow to
other parts of the world. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the actual size of the effect on
U.S. FDI outflow is very small; amounting to much less than 1% of overall FDI received by host
countries and economic regions in the model for recent years. I conclude that not only did an
appreciation of the U.S. dollar have no economically meaningful impact on U.S. FDI outflows
during this period, but also that exchange rate movements do not appear to spread through U.S.
outbound FDI to other parts of the world as well.

5

CHAPTER II
PLEDGED COLLATERAL AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE FROM JAPANESE INVESTMENT INTO THE U.S.
Introduction
The recent global financial crisis created strong interest in the important relationship
between finance and foreign direct investment (FDI). The OECD’s (2015) FDI financial flows
indicator shows that world-wide outward FDI is approximately 48 percent lower in 2009
compared to its peak in 2007. World-wide FDI financial outflows have subsequently struggled to
return to their previous levels. This observation generated a recent emphasis on financial barriers
to foreign market service which previously had been largely over-looked (for a recent survey see
Foley and Manova, 2014). Collateral, a demand-side barrier to external financing, has been
identified as an important factor to externally financing foreign market service. Firms pledge
collateral in the form of tangible assets, such as land, to secure external financing. Pledged
collateral is forfeited to the lender in the case of default, giving firms incentive to follow through
with repayment. Firms lacking in available collateral are constrained in their ability to pledge
collateral and obtain external financing.
This paper offers a different perspective on the collateral needed to externally finance
FDI. Previous literature focuses on the value of collateral available to the firm, asserting that
firms with larger values of available collateral are less constrained in their ability to secure
external financing. Instead, this paper considers how the value of pledged collateral varies with
productivity, a common measure of firm–level heterogeneity. Do heterogeneous firms pledge
similar amounts of collateral for the same borrowing need? I show using a simple theoretical
model that the value of collateral pledged is proportional to the firm’s productivity level. For the
same borrowing need, more productive firms pledge less collateral relative to less productive
6

firms. The claim is that more productive firms are safer investments in the eyes of lenders,
granting them the ability to pledge less collateral. However, a threshold level of productivity
must be met before borrowing is a feasible option. Firms with a productivity level below this
threshold must pledge collateral of greater value than their borrowing need.
I empirically examine my model using firm-level data on Japanese FDI into the United
States between 1980 and 2000. Japanese firms have a long held tradition of using bank lending
secured by land as a primary source of external finance. Land values in Japan collapsed in the
early 1990’s following the bursting of an asset bubble. The resulting financial crisis was, for all
intents and purposes, limited to Japan itself. This allows for the unique opportunity to
empirically study my theoretical model both prior to and following a collapse in collateral
values.6
My data consists of 619 Japanese multinational firms totaling 2,432 investments into the
U.S. during this time period. I build a measure of collateral pledged by Japanese firms using the
ratio of their land holdings to long–term loans. My empirical analysis shows that more
productive Japanese multinationals tend to pledge less collateral, particularly during the 1991–
2000 time period. These results are robust to use of either market land values or book land
values.
Chor and Manova (2012) and Manova (2013) illustrate how important available collateral
is to financially constrained exporters. Firms lacking in collateral are more vulnerable to
financial frictions, impeding their ability to export. Manonova et al. (2014) extends this idea
specifically to Chinese exporters to show that foreign affiliates in China have better export

6

Or, put more broadly, a period of both economic boom and bust.
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performance relative to domestic firms. This is due to the ability of a foreign affiliates to tap into
capital from their parent firm, offering them more assets to pledge as collateral.
Buch et al. (2014) illustrate the importance of collateral to multinational firms. The
authors present a collateral–based external financing model of FDI. Firms constrained in their
ability to pledge collateral scale back output, resulting in reduced profits. Data on German firms
is used to support the notion that a lack of collateral impedes FDI, with the effect being relatively
stronger for larger firms. Raff et al. (2015) study the impact of financial constraints on FDI using
firm–level data on Japanese multinationals. The authors use Japan’s land price collapse during
the early 1990’s as a natural experiment to study how the value of available collateral effects
FDI. Raff et al. show that a one percent reduction in land values held by Japanese firms reduced
the likelihood of FDI by approximately 0.3 percent over the period of 1980 – 1994.
The importance of collateral has also been identified in literature on corporate
investment. Gan (2007) considers the fixed investment activities of Japanese firms. Following
the collapse of Japan’s land price bubble in the early 1990’s, fixed investment rates decline by
0.8 of a percentage point for every 10 percentage point decline in the value of land held by firms.
Similarly, Cheney et al. (2012) consider the effect of fluctuations in real estate prices on
aggregate corporate investment of U.S. firms. The authors show that U.S. corporations invest six
cents out of every additional dollar of available collateral.
This paper complements previous literature by examining a different facet of collateral,
namely the value of collateral a firm chooses to pledge. Several contributions to the literature are
made. First, firms that are relatively more productive make more efficient use of their available
collateral. Second, relatively less productive firms may find external finance unattractive even if
they are not lacking in available collateral as they may need to pledge more in collateral than

8

what they seek to borrow. Finally, I provide empirical evidence of an inverse relationship
between pledged collateral and productivity using data on Japanese firms from 1980–2000.
Theoretical Model
Consider a segmented, two–country world composed of a domestic market and a foreign
market. There initially exists a continuum of firms located in, and producing solely for, the
domestic market. Firms are heterogeneous and differ by their retained earnings and productivity
level. Productivity is captured by the firm’s output–per–unit–labor coefficient, where a larger
coefficient indicates greater productivity. Let α denote a firm’s retained earnings and β its
productivity. Subsequently, a firm decides to also service the foreign market by establishing an
affiliate in the foreign market.
There is an associated sunk cost, denoted by F, included with establishing a foreign
affiliate that is associated with the investment’s minimum efficient scale. This captures things
such as building a plant and hiring workers that must be paid before profits can be realized.
Firms prefer to use their retained earnings if at all possible when paying F. This follows from the
pecking–order theory of corporate finance, popularized by Myers and Majluf (1984), that
suggests firms first prefer to use internal sources of financing as external sources are relatively
costlier due to informational asymmetries.
Firms with insufficient retained earnings seek external financing in the form of debt
financing. Let φ = max{0, F - α} denote the amount the firm needs to borrow to cover the sunk
cost of foreign market entry. Since the sunk cost of entry is associated with the investment’s
minimum efficient scale, firms unable to obtain needed financing do not establish a foreign
affiliate rather than scaling back the size of the investment.

9

Firms in need of external financing make a “take it or leave it” offer to a risk – neutral
lender. The contract specifies the amount borrowed φ, repayment amount D, and pledged
collateral γ. The probability that a firm’s investment is successful for the life of the loan, λ, is
private information to the firm. The lender only knows that λ is uniformly distributed between 0
and 1. However, the lender can infer productivity from the firm’s balance sheet.7 The lender
views a more productive firm as less likely to default on its loan.
To remain consistent with literature on foreign market service, consumers in both the
domestic and foreign market exhibit a love of variety with demand given by a CES utility
function for a continuum of goods indexed by variety ω:
σ-1
σ

U = [∫Ω q(ω) dω]

σ
σ-1

(1)

ω

Ωω is the set of available varieties and σ is the elasticity of substitution. Any given pair of
varieties are substitutes, therefore σ > 1. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) have shown that the optimal
consumption for a particular variety can be derived using the aggregate price index:
1-σ

P = [∫Ω p(ω)
ω

dω]

1
1-σ

(2)

Consumer demand for an individual variety is then given by:
q = Ap-σ

(3)

where A can be thought of as the demand level, or market size, and is exogenous from the view
of an individual firm.
Firms compete in a monopolistically competitive environment where each firm produces
a distinct variety. For simplicity, I adopt unit wages. The firms cost of domestic production is

7

This is most applicable to publicly traded firms.
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simply output sold, q, scaled by its productivity level β. Greater productivity results in the ability
to produce a unit of output at a lower cost. The cost function of a firm that produces domestically
is then:
q

CD = β

(4)

Firms that establish a foreign affiliate also face the additional cost function:
q

CFDI = β + F

(5)

The cost of foreign affiliate production differs from the domestic case by the sunk entry cost of
establishing a foreign affiliate. The firm’s domestic profit function is given by:
πD = pq -

q

(6)

β

The firm maximizes its profit subject to domestic demand in equation (3). This yields the optimal
price and output for domestic production:
pD =

σ
1
( )
(σ-1) β

qD = A[pD ]

(7)

-σ

Domestic pricing is determined by consumers’ elasticity of substitution, where more
productive firms charge a lower price. Output for a particular variety is decreasing in price,
meaning that more productive firms produce more since they charge a lower price. The firm’s
additional expected profits for establishing a foreign affiliate are:
πFDI = λpq -

q
β

- F + φ - λD - (1-λ)γ

(8)

subject to
q = Ap-σ
pq -

q

(8.1)

≥D

(8.2)

λD + (1-λ)γ -φ ≥ 0

(8.3)

β
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The profit function reads as follows: λpq -

q
β

- F + φ denotes the firm’s expected net revenue of

FDI with sunk cost F and external financing φ. The last two terms state that the firm repays the
lender D with probability λ, but defaults with probability (1-λ) and forfeits pledged collateral γ.
In addition to consumer demand (8.1), the firm must also consider liquidity constraint (8.2) and
participation constraint (8.3). The firm can at most offer its revenue as repayment to the lender.
The lender is only willing to lend if its net return surpasses its outside option, normalized to zero
here for simplicity. For cases when the firm does not need to seek external financing, optimal
price and quantity are given by:
pFDI =

σ
1
( )
(σ-1) λβ

qFDI = A[pFDI ]

(9)

-σ

Equations (9) differ from those of the domestic case by markup factor λ, the probability of a
successful investment. Given the same elasticity of substitution and productivity, foreign
affiliates charge a higher price and produce less than in the domestic case. A proof of this is
provided in Appendix A.1.
Under competitive credit markets, the firm adjusts its repayment such that the lender
breaks even in expected return. Therefore, firms adjust their repayment such that:
pq =

φ
λ

-

1-λ
γ

γ

(10)

Equation (10) can be used to obtain the value of collateral the firm pledges to borrow φ. Using
the optimal price and output from (9), solving (10) for γ yields the non-negative level of
collateral pledged to obtain external financing for FDI:8

A negative value for γ* indicates either that the firm has sufficient internal funds available, and does not need
external financing, or that the firm has a sufficiently large productivity such that it can obtain unsecured external
financing.
8

12

φ

λ

σ

1

γ* =max {0, (1-λ) - A (1-λ) [(σ-1) ( λβ )]

1-σ

}

(11)

Equation (11) leads to proposition 1:
∂γ*

Proposition 1 Pledged collateral increases with borrowing need ( ∂φ > 0), but decreases with
∂γ*

productivity ( ∂β < 0). When the amount borrowed is less than market size A, pledged collateral
is increasing for low probabilities of success and decreasing for larger probabilities of success.
Pledged collateral is unambiguously increasing in the probability of success for borrowing
amounts that meet or exceed market size A.
Proof See appendix A.2.
Pledged collateral increases with the amount borrowed, which makes intuitive sense.
More interesting, pledged collateral is decreasing in productivity. Consider two firms, who differ
only in their productivity level, seeking to establish a foreign affiliate. The relatively more
productive firm can secure the same amount of financing as the less productive firm with less
pledged collateral. In other words, a more productive firm can make more efficient use of its
available collateral. Finally, pledged collateral is initially increasing for low probabilities of
success, but is decreasing for higher probabilities of success. This non–linearity exists for
borrowing amounts less than the total market size. Pledged collateral is increasing in the
probability of success when borrowing amounts meet or exceed total market size.
Intuitively, a firm wants to pledge as little collateral as necessary to secure external
financing. However, when productivity is sufficiently low the value of pledged collateral is
larger than the amount borrowed. To show this, consider equation (11) when β is zero. Since the
exponent (1-σ) is negative due to the fact that σ > 1, equation (11) reduces to:
γ* =

φ

(12)

(1-λ)

13

When firm productivity is zero, pledged collateral is the amount borrowed, φ, scaled by a factor
1

of (1-λ) > 1.9 This illustrates that pledged collateral is greater than the amount borrowed for low
levels of productivity, suggesting that there exists a productivity level where the firm
collateralizes 100 percent of its loan. Let β* represent the productivity level that satisfies:
γ* = φ

(13)

Solving equation (12) for productivity yields:
*

β =

σ

1

A 1-σ
[ ]
λ(σ-1) φ

(14)

where β* represents the productivity cutoff that a firm must meet before the value of pledged
collateral is equal to or less than the amount borrowed. Firms with a productivity level β ≥ β*
obtain external financing by pledging a value of collateral equal to or less than the amount
borrowed. Firms with a productivity level β < β* can only obtain external financing by pledging
collateral of greater value than the amount borrowed. This leads to proposition 2:
Proposition 2 There exists a productivity level where pledged collateral is just equal to
borrowing need. Firms with a productivity level that fall below this cutoff must pledge collateral
of greater value than the amount borrowed.
Propositions 1 and 2 are graphically illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. The minimum level
of collateral to be pledged falls as productivity increases. A productivity level less than
β* indicates a lack of borrowing capacity in the sense that the firm would have to pledge
collateral of greater value than what is borrowed.

9

This is due to the fact that λ is bounded between 0 and 1, implying that (1-λ) < 1.
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Figure 2.1 – Pledged Collateral and Productivity
The shape of the pledged collateral line is dependent upon the elasticity of substitution. For
instance, pledged collateral is linear in productivity when σ = 2. This is due to the fact that the
exponent (1 - σ) in equation (11) reduces to 1 in absolute value. Pledged collateral is convex in
productivity when σ < 2 and concave in productivity when σ > 2. Figure 2.1 also illustrates that
productivity cutoff β* increases with elasticity of substitution σ. It can be shown that β* is
increasing in σ for levels of borrowing that do not exceed approximately one third of total market
size. This leads to proposition 3:
Proposition 3: For borrowing amounts φ <

A
e

the productivity cutoff such that pledged
∂β*

collateral is equal to the amount borrowed is increasing in the elasticity of substitution ( ∂σ >0).
Proof See appendix A.3.
Proposition 3 states that the more likely consumers are to substitute one variety for
another, firms must achieve higher levels of productivity before pledged collateral is equal to or
less than the amount borrowed. One possible explanation for this result may be due the more
competitive environment associated with consumers exhibiting larger elasticities of substitution.
Since more productive firms charge lower prices, consumers find varieties produced by these

15

firms more attractive. Less productive firms may find it harder to survive in this type of
environment, resulting in a larger productivity cutoff.
Data
My analysis is based on Japanese FDI into the United States from 1980 to 2000. This
time period captures the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy of the 1980s. Japanese land and
stock prices plunged approximately 50 percent during the early 1990s (Caballero et al. 2008).
Limiting the time period under consideration to these 20 years avoids confounding issues such as
the bursting of the dot–com bubble during the early 2000s and the global financial crisis of
2007–2008. This allows the unique opportunity to study the relationship between pledged
collateral and productivity during both a period of economic boom and bust unique to Japan.

Figure 2.2 – Japanese Investments into the U.S.
Figure 2.2 depicts both the number and average size of FDI projects flowing out of Japan
into the U.S. during this period. A sharp rise in the number of FDI projects occurred during the
1980s, coinciding with the height of Japan’s bubble economy. The number of investments into
the U.S. grows from around 100 per year to around 500 per year by the end of the 1980s. The
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number of FDI projects flowing into the U.S. rapidly declined to previous levels during the early
1990s, coinciding with the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy.
Japan’s culture of corporate finance is characterized by close ties between firms and their
main bank. Due to this, Japanese firms tend to make heavy use bank lending as their primary
source of external finance. By tradition, banks in Japan only lend on a secured basis by using
domestic land held by firms as collateral (Gan 2007). It comes as no surprise that the sharp rise
in the number and average size of FDI projects flowing out of Japan coincides with the land
price bubble of the latter half of the 1980s.
Data on Japanese FDI is sourced from Toyo Keizai Inc.’s Japanese Overseas Investment:
A complete listing by firms and countries (JOI). The JOI captures the entire universe of Japanese
FDI abroad. Among other things, the JOI lists the host country, month and year of establishment,
the size of the investment, and the equity share of the investment. Investments where the primary
Japanese investor holds at least 10 percent equity ownership are considered FDI. This is a
standard OECD definition of FDI. Financial data is taken from the Pacific Basin Capital Markets
(PACAP) database. The PACAP database provides detailed balance sheet information of all
publically traded Japanese firms. Table 2.1 lists relevant financial information obtained from the
PACAP database.
Pledged collateral is private contract information. However, a reasonable proxy can be
made using the ratio of a firm’s market value of land holdings to the value of its long–term loans.
As previously noted, Japan has a tradition of secured bank lending using land as collateral.
Because of this, it is reasonable to interpret the ratio of a firm’s land holdings to its outstanding
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long–term loans as a measure of how much collateral firms pledge relative to what they
borrow.10 This ratio increases as the amount of collateral pledged relative to borrowing increases.
Table 2.1 – Data from PACAP Database
Variable
Capital
Cash
Cash Flow
Employment
Gross profit
Industry
Intermediate Inputs
Leverage
Pledged collateral
Retained earnings
Return on Assets

Definition
Total capital stock
Cash on hand
Income from operations divided by total sales
Number of employees
Total revenue minus cost of goods sold
3–digit SIC code
Materials, semi–finished products, supplies, and machine equipment
Total debt divided by total assets
Market value of land holdings divided by long–term loans
Retained earnings on hand
Net income divided by total assets

Japanese firms are only required to report the book value of their land holdings. Firm’s
reported book values of land holdings are converted to market values following a method
popularized by Hoshi and Kashyap (1990). Land values are recorded as the purchase price,
suggesting a last in–first out (LIFO) method to calculate market values. However, a significant
divergence between firm’s book value and current market value of land held in 1980 has
occurred. Hayashi and Inoue (1991) suggest a method for overcoming this divergence where
they divide the market value of land in the National Accounts data for 1969 by the book value in
the Corporate Statistics Annual to obtain a conversion factor of 7.582446. Because my data starts
in 1980, this conversion factor was increased to 8 to account for the larger divergence.11 The
market value of firm’s landholdings is then allowed to fluctuate according to changes in Japanese
land market values, creating fluctuations that are exogenous to the firm without concern about
endogeneity due to the purchase or sale of land by firms.

10
11

Long–term loans are used as these are the most likely to be secured by collateral.
Results do not appear sensitive to this conversion factor.
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The Japanese Urban Land Price Index, published by the Japanese Ministry of
International Affairs and Communications in the Japan Statistical Yearbook, was used to
calculate market land prices. Variations in land price across regions exists as well. To account
for this the postal code of firms’ headquarters are used to identify their regional location.
Metropolitan–level land prices are used for firms headquartered in major urban areas (such as
Tokyo). Prefecture or national land prices are used for remaining firms not located in major
urban areas.
A potential issue when estimating a production function to obtain total factor productivity
(TFP) is correlation between unobserved productivity shocks and inputs. Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) suggest the use of intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. The
authors have subsequently introduced a STATA command that estimates a production function
to obtain TFP using the above method. For more details, see Petrin, Poi, and Levinsohn (2004).
Data available from the PACAP on firms’ gross profit, capital stock, employment, and
intermediate inputs12 was used to estimate TFP in this fashion.
To focus on FDI, firms in the PACAP are matched to parent firms in the JOI based upon
their Tokyo Stock Exchange ID. The resulting data corresponds to all FDI by publicly traded
firms in Japan flowing to the U.S. from 1980 to 2000. This consists of 619 unique firms making
a total of 2,432 investments. However, only 456 of these 619 firms have financial data available
for the entire time period under consideration; resulting is 1,762 investments in total. There are
30 distinctly different industries at the 3–digit SIC level present in the data, with just over half of
these in the manufacturing sector. Table 2.2 presents average values of relevant financial
characteristics over five year intervals for firms that have a foreign affiliate.

12

These are: materials, semi–finished products, supplies, and machine equipment.
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Table 2.2 – Average Values for Publicly Traded Firms with a Foreign Affiliate
Variable
TFP

1980–1985 1986–1990 1991–1995 1996–2000
3.13
4.48
4.31
4.14

Retained earningsa

35,986

103,229

109,624

129,137

Market value of land holdingsa

54,848

249,711

200,654

71,669

Long–term loansa

30,152

83,640

58,082

51,826

41.93
0.061
0.701
0.026

237.34
0.053
0.634
0.022

151.21
0.036
0.594
0.011

84.98
0.007
0.569
0.005

Pledged collateral
Cash Flow
Leverage
Return on assets

b

a - Millions of Yen. b - defined as the ratio of the market value of land holdings to long – term loans

Firms appear to be relatively more productive and hold more in retained earnings in the latter
half of the 1990s as compare to the former half of the 1980s. Not surprisingly, land prices are
quite a bit higher in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This corresponds to the inflation and bursting
of Japan’s land price bubble during this period. Firms also appear to have relatively larger long–
term loans and pledge more in collateral during this period. Cash flows and return on assets
appear lower in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. Lastly, firms appear to be more leveraged in
the 1980’s as compared to the 1990s.
Empirical Strategy and Results
The relationship between pledged collateral and productivity is of main interest.
However, care must be taken because some industries may be more be dependent on external
finance or relatively more land intensive than others. Therefore, I calculate the industry–year
average for firms’ pledged collateral. I then look at firms’ deviation from the industry–year
average. Firms that fall below the industry–year average tend to pledge less in collateral while
firms that fall above the industry–year average tend to pledge more in collateral. This method of
looking at firms’ deviation from industry–year average is applied to all other variables used in
my empirical analysis as well. My empirical model is then:
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̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ ) = α1 (TFPijt-1 - TFP
̅̅̅̅̅jt-1 )
(PledgedCollateralijt - PledgedCollateral
jt
+ α2 (RetainedEarnsijt-1 - ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
RetainedEarnsjt-1 )
+ α3 (CashFlowijt-1 - ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
CashFlowjt-1 )
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅jt-1 )
+ α4 (ReturnAssetsijt-1 -ReturnAssets
+ α5 (Leverageijt-1 - ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
Leveragejt-1 )
+ α6 PrevInvit-1 + α7 Industryit-1 + εijt
where an upper bar indicates the average. The left hand side of the above empirical model is the
deviation of pledged collateral (PledgedCollateral) of firm i in industry j at time t from average
pledged collateral by all firms in industry j at time t. Right hand side variables are lagged by one
year to account for the time difference between when a firm makes the decision to invest and
when it appears in the dataset.
TFP is the Levinsohn–Petrin measure of total factor productivity discussed in Section 3.
RetainedEarns, CashFlow, ReturnAssets, and Leverage represent retained earnings, cash flow,
return on assets, and leverage respectively. These variables follow from Table 2.1. Firms with
greater levels of retained earnings may not need to be rely on external finance as much. Cash
flow and return on assets are indicators of how profitable the firm is. Intuitively, more profitable
firms might be viewed as less likely to default, leading to less pledged collateral. Leverage is
more ambiguous. Highly leveraged firms may need to pledge more collateral as they potentially
run a higher risk of default. However, a larger leverage ratio may also be indicative of a firm that
tends to heavily borrow; resulting in a strong relationship with their bank and the tendency to
pledge less collateral.
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PrevInv is a count, at the time of investment, of the number previously observed foreign
affiliates established by the firm. This captures the firm’s track record when it comes to FDI.
Firms with a history of successful FDI projects are more appealing in the eyes of the lender and
may end up pledging less collateral because of this. Industry is a full set of industry–time
dummies included to capture industry fixed effects. As mentioned above, these dummies capture
30 distinct industries present in the data at the 3–digit SIC level. Finally, ε is the robust error
term.
Table 2.3 – Pledged Collateral of Japanese FDI into U.S.
1980–2000
-0.149*
(0.066)

1980–1990
-0.082
(0.113)

1991–2000
-0.197**
(0.075)

RetainedEarns

< 0.001
(< 0.001)

< 0.001
(< 0.001)

< 0.001*
(< 0.001)

CashFlow

286.737
(346.549)

-19.106
(524.359)

538.105
(621.523)

ReturnAssets

246.502
(731.176)

993.651
(1829.384)

36.135
(689.316)

Leverage

-392.522**
150.404

-418.696
(216.156)

-218.769
(243.236)

PrevInv

-3.529*
(1.401)
1718
0.16

-5.951**
(0.862)
1144
0.18

-1.922
(3.780)
574
0.16

TFP

N
R–squared

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level,
respectively. Industry dummies included but not reported.

Results are reported in Table 2.3. Over the time period of 1980 to 2000 firms that are
relatively more productive do appear to pledge less in collateral. The same is true for firms that
have previously established foreign affiliates. Relatively more leveraged firms appear to pledge
lesser amounts of collateral as well. A possible explanation for this may be what is commonly
22

referred to as the existence of “zombie firms” (see Caballero et al. 2008, for example) in Japan
during this time period. A zombie firm is a highly inefficient, debt–laden, firm that is kept on life
support by continual lending13 from its main bank. Pledged collateral may be a moot point in this
type of relationship and may be a possible reason for the observed negative coefficient on
leverage.
A structural break around 1990 is likely. This coincides with the bursting of Japan’s
bubble economy and the large drop in outgoing FDI illustrated in Figure 2.2. A simple Chow test
of the null hypothesis that α1 through α6 are equal in the periods 1980–1990 and 1991–2000
yields and F statistic of 6.54 and critical value F6,1706 = 2.0986. Thus the null hypothesis is
rejected, indicating that we do indeed have a structural break in 1990.
The last two columns of Table 2.3 present results for these two sub–periods. The key
factor to pledged collateral in the 1980–1990 appears to be the firm’s previous FDI history.
Firms with more previously established foreign affiliates pledge less collateral. However, a
different pattern emerges in the period following the burst of Japan’s bubble economy and
subsequent “lost decade.” In this instance, productivity and retained earnings appear key to
pledged collateral. Firms that are more productive and have more retained earnings are able
pledge less collateral in an environment of tighter credit.
To put the relationship between pledged collateral and productivity into context,
elasticities are computed. For the overall period of 1980 to 2000 a one percent increase in
productivity above industry average leads to an approximate 0.05 percent reduction in pledged
collateral below industry average. However, when attention is focused to post 1990 a one percent
increase in productivity above industry average leads to an approximate 0.73 percent reduction in

13

This is sometimes referred to “evergreen” lending.
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pledged collateral below industry average. This can translate into a meaningful reduction in
pledged collateral for large values of borrowing.
Robustness
Table 2.4 – Pledged Collateral of Japanese FDI into U.S. Using Book Values of Land Holdings
1980–2000
-0.013*
(0.006)

1980–1990
-0.013
(0.012)

1991–2000
-0.015*
(0.007)

RetainedEarns

< 0.001
(< 0.001)

< 0.001
(< 0.001)

< 0.001
(< 0.001)

CashFlow

-71.219
(61.411)

-83.745
(89.469)

-101.246
(110.807)

ReturnAssets

250.480*
(110.881)

412.984
(312.362)

245.405*
(124.058)

Leverage

-29.685
(24.375)

7.900
(42.681)

-82.037*
(33.361)

PrevInv

-0.163*
(76.000)
1718
0.04

-0.093
(0.052)
1144
0.05

-0.191
(0.205)
574
0.11

TFP

N
R–squared

Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. Industry dummies
included but not reported.

The robustness of the above results is examined in several ways. First, to see how
sensitive the above results are to land values the empirical model was re–estimated using book
values of land to calculate pledged collateral. Table 2.4 presents results using the book value of
land holdings to calculate pledged collateral rather than the more relevant market value. Results,
in terms of TFP, are consistent to those found in Section 4.

Table 2.5 – Pledged Collateral of Japanese FDI into U.S. 1980–2000
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TFP

-0.162**
(-0.036)

-0.127*
(0.057)

RetainedEarns

< 0.001**
(< 0.001)

< 0.001
(< 0.001)

CashFlow

79.807
(-354.664)

213.766
(358.230)

ReturnAssets

950.623
(-596.331)

128.602
(754.219)

Leverage

-396.523**
(-153.99)

-397.799**
(151.712)

PrevInv

-5.667**
(-0.717)

-8.948
(5.272)

PrevInv2

0.050
(0.038)

Industry Dummies
N
R–squared

No
1718
0.08

Yes
1718
0.16

Second, the estimations of Section 4 were performed with the exclusion industry – time
dummies. The first column of results in Table 2.5 shows that productivity continues to be an
important factor to pledged collateral when industry fixed effects are excluded. Third, the
possibility of diminishing returns in the number of previously established foreign affiliates is
accounted for by including the squared term PrevInv2. The second column of results in Table 2.5
does not show evidence of diminishing returns, and results continue to remain consistent with
those of Section 4. While only results for the entire time period have been reported in Table 2.5
for the sake of brevity, results within the sub–periods remain consistent with Section 4 as well.
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Conclusion
This paper presents a theoretical model illustrating that more productive firms pledge less
collateral relative to less productive firms. This allows more productive firms to make more
efficient use of their available collateral. However, firms with a productivity level below a
threshold need to pledge collateral of greater value than the amount they seek to borrow. I submit
that this may be unattractive to a firm, even if it has the necessary collateral available. This
threshold increases as consumers become more likely to substitute one variety of a product for
another, so long the amount borrowed is less than approximately one third of the total market
size.
Empirically analyzing the relationship between productivity and pledged collateral
presents a challenge as pledged collateral is private contract information. A reasonable proxy
was found by using the ratio of land holdings to long–term loans. This method has merit due to
Japan’s tradition of bank lending secured by land. Results support the proposed theoretical
inverse relationship between productivity and pledged collateral and are strongest for the 1991–
2000 time period in Japan. These results are robust to use of either market land values or book
land values. They are also robust to the inclusion or exclusion of industry fixed effects. These
results suggest that further analysis of this facet of collateral holds merit.
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CHAPTER III
FOREIGN AFFILIATE OWNERSHIP EQUITY AND FINANCIAL FRICTIONS: EVIDENCE
FROM JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS
Introduction
Foreign affiliate ownership structure is one of many decisions an investor makes when
establishing a foreign affiliate. Factors specific to the firm or host country are usually
emphasized as determinants of ownership equity. These factors include previous investment
experience, knowledge of institutions unique to the host country, costs and benefits of sharing
equity with partners, how risky the investor perceives the host country, and host country foreign
ownership restrictions. This paper instead considers how financial shocks in the home country
affect foreign affiliate ownership equity.
Japanese multinationals were subject to a large, exogenous financial shocks during the
1980s and 1990s. Land prices surged during the late 1980s, resulting in a large land price bubble
which subsequently collapsed during the early 1990s. Stock and land prices lost approximately
half their value during the 1990s, sending Japan into financial crisis. Domestically–held land is a
traditional form of collateral in Japan’s culture of corporate finance (Gan, 2007). High land
prices may ease the process of obtaining financing, while low land prices may create a barrier to
obtaining financing. Intuitively, a positive shock to land prices increases the level of available
collateral, thereby increasing borrowing capacity, and vice versa. A multinational firm may opt
to establish a wholly owned foreign affiliate, as opposed to sharing ownership with a partner, as
a result of increased borrowing capacity.14 In other words, increased borrowing capacity may
make an investment partner unnecessary.

14

Conversely, a negative shock to land prices may result in establishing a foreign affiliate via shared ownership due
to decreased borrowing capacity.
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Previous work on the ownership equity structure of foreign affiliates focuses on
transaction costs (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Gomes–Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1988 &
1991). Firms in need of specific assets that involve large transaction costs when obtained on their
own are more likely to share ownership of the foreign affiliate. For example, establishing a
foreign affiliate outside the main business, or industry, of the parent may require assets the
parent firm lacks, such as knowledge or technology. Forming a partnership with a firm in
possession of the necessary assets avoids any transaction costs involved with obtaining the assets
on their own. However, there are downsides. Issues with aligning incentives between partners
and protecting proprietary knowledge may outweigh the benefits of shared ownership. Whole
ownership is more likely when the firm contributes a high degree of specific assets, such as
knowledge or technology (e.g. Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Asiedu
and Esfahani, 2001; Raff et al., 2009). Firms with more international experience are also more
likely to have wholly owned foreign affiliates (Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998). Whole ownership
is also more likely for firms that are relatively more productive (Raff et al., 2012).
This paper adds to the literature by considering the impact a financial shock in the home
country has on the ownership equity decision of multinational firms when establishing a foreign
affiliate. In particular, I consider how a shock to land prices, a primary source of Japanese
business collateral, shaped the ownership equity of Japanese foreign affiliates. The run up of
Japan’s asset prices during the late 1980s coincides with a boom in outward Japanese FDI. The
collapse in Japan’s assets prices during the 1990s also coincides with a significant drop in the
amount of outward Japanese FDI as well. Previous literature shows that negative financial
shocks, such as reduced access to financing or reduced collateral, decrease the overall amount of
outward Japanese FDI (e.g. Klein et al., 2002 and Raff et al., 2015).
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It is reasonable to believe that a financial shock, whether it be positive or negative, may
also have a meaningful influence on the ownership equity of Japanese foreign affiliates.
Intuitively, there should be a positive relationship between the level of collateral available to a
firm and ownership equity in their foreign affiliate at the time of establishment. A positive shock
to collateral increases borrowing capacity, easing a firm’s ability to finance a wholly owned
foreign affiliate. A negative shock to collateral decreases borrowing capacity, making a firm’s
ability to finance a wholly owned foreign affiliate more difficult. This may result in the firm
sharing ownership of the foreign affiliate with an investment partner.
I address this question by analyzing impulse response functions for Japanese FDI into 12
OECD host countries from 1975 to 2000. I find that, on average, Japanese multinationals
increase ownership equity in core affiliates established subsequent to a positive shock to land
value by approximately 4–8 percentage points. I find this to be statistically significant for foreign
affiliates appearing in the data approximately a year following the shock to land value. A
positive shock to land value does not appear to affect the ownership equity decision of Japanese
multinationals establishing non–core foreign affiliates. This may be due to the fact that non–core
affiliates are likely to require assets and knowledge that the parent does not possess and can only
obtain by sharing ownership. In this case how far away the affiliate is from the core business of
the parent is likely more important to ownership equity decisions than the level of available
collateral.
Data
My analysis consists of a panel of Japanese FDI into 12 OECD host countries from 1975
to 2000.15 I consider 1975 as the initial period of data due to the fact that an appreciable amount

15

These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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of FDI did not start flowing out of Japan until 1972.16 Prior to the 1970s various federal
regulations restricted the ability of Japanese firms to establish affiliates outside of Japan
(Komiya and Wakasugi, 1991). These restrictions were relaxed over the period of 1969 to 1972.
An interesting feature of the time period I consider is that it captures the run up of
Japan’s land price bubble of the 1980s and its subsequent burst during the 1990s. Ending the
sample period in the year 2000 captures this unique period of Japan’s history. Land prices in
Japan during this time period are shown in Figure 3.1. One can clearly see the run up of a land
prices during the 1980s and its subsequent collapse during the early 1990s.

Figure 3.1 – Japan Urban Land Price Index 17

16

The year 1972 is referred to as the gannen (the very first year) of outward Japanese FDI (Komiya and Wakasugi,
1991).
17

1980 is used as the base year
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This allows the opportunity to examine how available collateral influences ownership equity of
Japanese foreign affiliates during a time where Japanese multinationals experienced both
significant positive and negative shocks to the value of their collateral.
Japanese FDI activity is obtained from Toyo Keizai Inc.’s Japanese Overseas
Investment: A complete listing by firms and countries (JOI). Relevant information taken from the
JOI include the host country of the foreign affiliate, its year of establishment, and equity share of
the Japanese investor. Care has been taken to also identify the Standard Industry Code (SIC) of
the foreign affiliate. This allows me to identify foreign affiliates that belong to the same core
business as their Japanese parent. Foreign affiliates are identified as core affiliates if they belong
to the same 2–digit SIC as their Japanese parent. I also identify new investors as Japanese
multinationals with no previously established foreign affiliates in Europe, the U.S., or Canada.
Established investors are those with at least one previously established foreign affiliate.
Domestic land held by all publicly traded Japanese multinationals is obtained from the
Pacific Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) database. However, Japanese firms need only report
book value of their land. Hoshi and Kashyap (1990) proposed a last in–first out (LIFO) method
to calculate market values due to the face that land values are recorded at the purchase price. But,
as pointed out by Hayashi and Inoue (1991), the book value differs from the market value in the
initial period of the data. Hayashi and Inoue suggest adjusting book value to market value in the
initial period by use of a conversion factor. They divide the market value of land in the National
Accounts data for 1969 by the book value in the Corporate Statistics Annual to obtain a
conversion factor of approximately 7.6.
I use a conversion factor of 8 in order to account for a larger divergence between book
and market value due to the fact that my initial period is 1975. Subsequently, the value of
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landholdings is only allowed to fluctuate according to changes in the Japanese Urban Land Price
Index found in the Japan Statistical Yearbook.18 To account for heterogeneity in regional land
prices, firm headquarter postal codes are used to identify their regional location. Where possible,
metropolitan–level land prices are used for firms headquartered in major urban areas (such as
Tokyo). I use prefecture land prices for firms not located in major urban areas, with national land
prices used for any remaining firms.
My data allows me to observe individual foreign affiliates established in a country–year
and the Japanese parents who establish each foreign affiliate. I identify the amount of ownership
equity the Japanese parent has in their foreign affiliate and the value of land the Japanese parent
holds domestically. I also identify whether or not the foreign affiliate is outside the core business
of the Japanese parent and whether or not the Japanese parent has a previously established
foreign affiliate. Realistically, however, a Japanese multinational does not establish a foreign
affiliate in a given country each year. For example, Honda Motors established a foreign affiliate
in the UK during the years 1978, 1979, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1992, and 1998.
A non–trivial number of missing observations occur when the data is examined at the
firm–level. To address this, I aggregate my data to country–year averages. This results in average
ownership equity of foreign affiliates newly established by Japanese multinationals in a
particular country for a given year. The same is true for land values. After aggregation, I am left
with the average value of domestically–held for Japanese multinationals who newly establish a
foreign affiliate in a particular country for a given year. Also, because I can identify whether a
foreign affiliate is in the parent’s core business and whether the parent has established any prior

18

This creates land value fluctuations exogenous to the firm and alleviates concern of endogeneity resulting from
the firm purchasing or selling land to do FDI.
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foreign affiliates, I am able to split my data into various groups based upon these characteristics
prior to aggregation.
Care must be taken when considering what truly represents the contemporaneous
relationship between ownership equity and land prices in my data. What is observed in the data
is when the foreign affiliate first opened its doors for business. The reality is that the process of
establishing a new foreign affiliate does not happen swiftly.19 This implies that the decision to
establish a foreign affiliate that appears in the data for 1990, for example, was based on
information available to the firm in a previous time period, such as 1989. To account for this, I
lag my data on land held by Japanese multinationals by one year prior to aggregation. This better
represents the value of land held by the firm when it made its decisions about establishing the
foreign affiliate.
Plots of average the ownership equity for Japanese foreign affiliates in each country of
the sample are shown Figure 3.2. Countries that tend to host relatively more new affiliates from
Japanese multinationals each year, such as Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the U.S., see a
relatively larger level of average ownership equity of Japanese foreign affiliates. In these cases,
ownership equity is consistently 80% or more. Countries that tend to host relatively fewer new
affiliates from Japanese multinationals each year, such as Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland, see
a relatively lower level of average ownership equity of Japanese foreign affiliates. There does
not appear to be any clear, systematic pattern for any country in Figure 3.2 that might be
considered indicative of an ownership equity restriction for Japanese FDI.20

19

This could either be construction of a new plant or the negotiation process involved in acquiring an existing plant.
It is worth mentioning that restrictions on FDI inflows into OECD countries, in general, have declined greatly
since 1980 (Golub, 2003).
20
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Figure 3.2 – Average Foreign Affiliate Ownership Equity
Empirical Strategy
I use a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) methodology. At the time the PVAR is
estimated, all variables are treated as endogenous in a system of equations, namely land value
and ownership equity.21 Short–run dynamics among the variables can then be subsequently
identified via impulse response functions (IRFs). A PVAR fits well with my data structure. I am
limited to, at most, 26 observations per country, making a separate estimation for each country
difficult.22 Stacking my data and estimating a PVAR is my solution to this limitation.
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An advantage of this methodology is that the model does not require strong a priori theory.
For example, I only have 19 observations for Austria as no investment occurred by the Japanese multinationals in
my data set during 1975, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1997, 1999, and 2000.
22
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To fix ideas, consider the following first–order PVAR model with k variables and a panel
fixed effect:
Yit = A1 Yit-1 + αi + eit , i = 1, 2, … ,N; t = 1, 2, … , T
where Yit is a (k x 1) vector of endogenous variables. For the case at hand two variables are
being considered (k = 2) so that Yit = (LANDit , OWNERSHIPit )' . LANDit is a row vector
composed of the average price of domestic land held by the Japanese parent for affiliates located
in the 12 countries being considered over the time period 1975 – 2000. Much the same,
OWNERSHIPit is a row vector composed of the average ownership equity held by the Japanese
parent for affiliates located in the 12 countries being considered over the time period 1975 –
2000. A1 is a (k x k) matrix of parameters to be estimated. The panel fixed effect is denoted by
αi and eit denotes well-behaved idiosyncratic errors23, both having dimension (1 x k).
The above represents a system of dynamic panels. However, as is well known in dynamic
panels, the standard fixed effects estimator produces inconsistent results requiring use of a
generalized method of moment (GMM) or two–stage instrumental variable estimator (Nickell,
1981; Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Holtz–Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991). I use the
forward orthogonal deviation transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) to
eliminate the fixed effect from the model by removing the mean of all available future
observations. This transformation does not magnify gaps present in unbalanced panels, thereby
minimizing data loss. The forward orthogonal deviation transformation also preserves
orthogonality between transformed variables and the variables in level (i.e. untransformed).
Lagged variables in level are then used as instruments and parameters can be estimated by

The idiosyncratic errors are assumed to have the following characteristics: E[eit ] = 0, E[e'it eit ] = 0, and
E[e'it eis ] = 0 for all t > s.
23
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system GMM. I estimate my model using the PVAR STATA program developed by Abrigo and
Love (2015), which is capable of performing a forward orthogonal deviation transformation and
estimation via GMM.
A first order PVAR is chosen based upon model selection criteria proposed by Andrews
and Lu (2001) for GMM models, which include counterparts to the commonly used Akaike,
Bayesian, and Hannan-Quinn information criteria. This information is presented in Table 3.1.
Tests were performed for a first, second, and third order PVAR. A first order PVAR is the
preferred model based on the model section criteria, as it minimizes the AIC, BIC, and HQIC.
Table 3.1 – Model Order Selection for Dynamic Panel
Lag
1
2
3

AIC
-20.39
-14.27
-8.90

BIC
-74.32
-54.71
-35.86

HQIC
-42.18
-30.61
-19.79

Note: AIC, BIC, and HQIC are the Akaike, Bayesian, and Hannan-Quinn information criterion, respectively,
proposed by Andrews and Lu (2001) for dynamic panels estimated via GMM.

Table 3.2 presents results of Fisher–type tests for unit roots in panel data (Choi, 2001).24
A Fisher–type test was chosen as it works well when panels are unbalanced. The null hypothesis
that my panels contain a unit root are strongly rejected. Both variables are stationary in levels for
each panel.
My estimations are verified to be stable, which ensures the model is invertible and has an
infinite order vector moving average representation.25 Impulse response functions can then be
interpreted in the typical fashion. A Cholesky decomposition is used to orthogonalize shocks to

The Fisher–type test performs a standard univariate augmented Dickey–Fuller unit-root test on each panel’s series
separately, then combine the p-values to obtain an overall test statistic as to whether or not the panel series contains
a unit root.
25
The modulus of each eigenvalue of the companion matrix is strictly less than one. See Hamilton (1994) or
Lütkepohl (2005) for details.
24
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the model in order to obtain impulse response functions. This places a recursive structure on the
model such that variables that enter first in ordering contemporaneously effect those lower in the
ordering, but not vice versa. The value of land enters first in the model and ownership equity
enters second. This results in a structure where shocks to land value have a contemporaneous
impact on ownership equity in the model, but shocks to ownership equity do not
contemporaneously affect land value in the model. This is a reasonable structure to impose as
overall land prices in Japan are relatively more exogenous than multinational firms.
Table 3.2 – Fisher-Type Panel Unit-Root Test Based on Augmented Dicky-Fuller Tests
H0: Panels contain unit roots

Number of panels

12

H1: Panels are stationary

Average number of periods

24

Variable

Statistic

P-value

Inverse chi-squared
Inverse normal
Inverse logit
Modified inverse chi-squared

95.51
-6.65
-7.51
10.32

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Inverse chi-squared
Inverse normal
Inverse logit
Modified inverse chi-squared

87.19
-6.29
-6.82
9.12

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Land Value

Ownership Equity

Note: Cross sectional means removed. Augmented Dicky-Fuller tests performed with 1 lag, but results are robust
to the use of 2 lags as well.

However, as discussed in Section 2, a contemporaneous shock in the model does not truly
mean within the same year given the manner the data is structured. A lag occurs between the
time a firm makes the decision to establish a foreign affiliate and when the affiliate appears in
my data. Land prices are lagged one year to address this concern. This better represents the value
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of land held by Japanese firms in my data when they made their decision to establish a foreign
affiliate. The impulse response functions presented in the next section represent the ownership
equity of foreign affiliates appearing in the data a year or more following a shock to land value.
Results
Figure 3.3 presents the dynamic response of ownership equity to a one standard deviation
shock in land value, estimated using the full data sample. Japanese multinationals hold
approximately 2 percentage points more ownership equity in their foreign affiliates appearing in
the data a year following a positive shock to land value. The response of ownership equity is
statistically insignificant for foreign affiliates appearing in the data beyond a year following the
shock. This supports the intuition that larger amounts of available collateral increase a firm’s
borrowing capacity, making it easier to establish wholly owned foreign affiliates.
This result merits a deeper look. Previous literature, discussed in the introduction, suggests that
firms with more international experience hold a larger amount of ownership equity in their
foreign affiliates. Firms also hold a larger amount of ownership equity in foreign affiliates inside
their core business. To investigate further, I consider the experience level of the parent firm and
whether the affiliate is established inside the parent’s core business.
Figure 3.4 presents the dynamic response of ownership equity to a one standard deviation
shock in land value, separating inexperienced Japanese parents from experienced ones. I consider
a parent to be inexperienced if it has no previously established affiliates in Europe, the U.S., or
Canada. I consider a parent to be experienced if it has at least one previously established foreign
affiliate in Europe, the U.S., or Canada. A positive shock to land value does not lead to a
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Figure 3.3 – Full Sample 26
statistically significant response in ownership equity for either experienced or inexperienced
parents at any time horizon. Figure 3.4 provides no evidence that Japanese parents with
international experience adjust ownership equity when establishing foreign affiliates following a
positive shock to their source of collateral.
Figure 3.5 presents the dynamic response of ownership equity to a one standard deviation
shock in land value, separating affiliates in the parent’s core business from those not in the
parent’s core business. Affiliates whose 2–digit SIC matches that of their Japanese parent are

26

Confidence bands are estimated using Gaussian approximation based on Monte Carlo draws from the estimated
panel PVAR model. This procedure is repeated 1000 times. The 2.5 th and 97.5th percentile of this distribution is used
as the confidence interval for the impulse response. A larger or smaller amount of Monte Carlo repetitions does not
affect results.
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Figure 3.4 – Investor Experience
said to be in the parent’s core business. A positive shock to land value does not affect the
ownership equity decision of Japanese multinationals establishing foreign affiliates outside their
core business; the IRF is statistically insignificant at all time horizons. However, Japanese
parents establishing foreign affiliates inside their core business do respond to a positive land
value shock. A positive shock to land value results in an approximate 4 percentage point increase
in ownership equity of core affiliates appearing in the data a year following the shock. This
response becomes statistically insignificant for core affiliates appearing in the data beyond a year
following the shock.
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Figure 3.5 – Core Investment
The above provides evidence that Japanese multinationals, on average, increase
ownership equity by approximately 2–4 percentage points in foreign affiliates established
subsequent a positive shock to their collateral source, particularly for foreign affiliates inside
their core business. It is unlikely a firm lacks the necessary assets and knowledge required to
establish a foreign affiliate inside their core business. It is more likely the need to share
ownership of a core affiliate arises due to financial constraints. A positive shock to a firm’s
collateral source is likely to increase its ability to borrow, making whole ownership of the
affiliate more feasible.
Japanese multinationals establishing non–core foreign affiliates do not appear to respond
to a positive land value shock. Unlike core affiliates, firms may indeed lack the necessary assets
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and knowledge required to establish a foreign affiliate outside their core business. This may
result in the need to share ownership with a partner in possession of the necessary assets and
knowledge. For situations such as these, how far away the affiliate is from the core business of
the parent is likely a bigger factor to the ownership equity decision as opposed to how much
collateral it has available. This may be why my results do not show a statically significant
response for the case of non–core affiliates.
Robustness Check
Raff et al. (2009) show that more productive Japanese multinationals exhibit a larger
degree of ownership equity in their foreign affiliates. Results in the previous section do not
account for this variable. To address this, I extend the model of the previous section to a three
variable PVAR. I use Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) measure of productivity where total factor
productivity of a firm is estimated with use of intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobserved
productivity shocks.27 Land value and productivity are lagged by one year before aggregating
firm–level data to country–year averages. This is done for the same reasons described in Section
2.
Table 3.3 – Model Order Selection for Dynamic Panel
Lag
1
2
3

AIC
-34.93
-34.04
-25.14

BIC
-135.88
-109.75
-75.61

HQIC
-75.93
-64.80
-45.64

Note: AIC, BIC, and HQIC are the Akaike, Bayesian ,and Hannan-Quinn information criterion, respectively,
proposed by Andrews and Lu (2001) for dynamic panels estimated via GMM .

27

These are taken from the PACAP database and include: materials, semi–finished products, supplies, and machine
equipment.
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A first order PVAR is again chosen based upon model selection criteria proposed by
Andrews and Lu (2001) as shown in Table 3.3. A first order model is preferred to a second or
third order model based on the section criteria as it minimizes the AIC, BIC, and HQIC. I check
for unit roots in my panels by again using the Fisher–type tests (Choi, 2001) presented in Table
3.4. All three variables are stationary in levels for each panel. Estimation of my three variable
PVAR is verified to be stable. I again use a Cholesky decomposition to orthogonalize shocks to
the model in order to obtain impulse response functions.
Table 3.4 – Fisher-Type Panel Unit-Root Test Based on Augmented Dicky-Fuller Tests
H0: Panels contain unit roots
H1: Panels are stationary

Number of panels
12
Average number of periods 18

Variable

Statistic

P-value

Inverse chi-squared
Inverse normal
Inverse logit
Modified inverse chi-squared

75.98
-5.53
-5.86
7.50

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Inverse chi-squared
Inverse normal
Inverse logit
Modified inverse chi-squared

78.69
-4.93
-5.66
7.89

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Inverse chi-squared
Inverse normal
Inverse logit
Modified inverse chi-squared

66.98
-4.72
-5.01
6.20

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Land Value

Ownership Equity

Productivity

Note: Cross sectional means removed. Augmented Dicky-Fuller tests performed with 1 lag, but results are robust
to the use of 2 lags.
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Land value enters first in the ordering, productivity enters second, and ownership equity
enters last. This results in a recursive structure where shocks to land value have a
contemporaneous impact on productivity and ownership equity, and shocks to productivity have
a contemporaneous impact on ownership equity, but shocks to ownership equity do not have a
contemporaneous impact on either productivity or land value. Land value enters above
ownership equity for the same reason described in Section 3. Productivity enters above
ownership equity due to the findings of Raff et al. (2009). I continue to place land value first in
the ordering.
Figure 3.6 presents the dynamic response of ownership equity to a one standard deviation
shock in land value and productivity, estimated using the full data sample.

Figure 3.6 – Full Sample Accounting for Productivity
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A positive shock to land value results in an approximate 2 percentage point increase in
ownership equity for foreign affiliates appearing in the data a year following the shock. The
response of ownership equity is statistically insignificant for foreign affiliates appearing in the
data beyond a year following the shock. A positive shock to productivity results in
approximately 1 percentage point greater ownership equity for foreign affiliates appearing in the
data a year following the shock. This peaks at a near 4 percentage point increase for foreign
affiliates appearing in the data two years following the shock. The response of ownership equity
is statistically insignificant for foreign affiliates appearing in the data beyond three years
following the productivity shock. These results are consistent with Section 4 and also agree with
those of Raff et al. (2009) as well.
Figure 3.7 presents the dynamic response of ownership equity to a one standard deviation
shock in land value, separating core from non–core affiliates. Results for non–core affiliates
continue to be statistically insignificant. Japanese multinationals increase ownership equity in
core affiliates appearing in the data a year following the shock by approximately 8 percentage
points. This response is statistically insignificant for foreign affiliates appearing in the data
beyond a year following the shock.
These results are qualitatively consistent with Section 4. Japanese multinationals, on
average, increase ownership equity in foreign affiliates established subsequent a positive shock
to their collateral source. This observation is most applicable to core affiliates. This is likely due
to the reasons discussed at the end of Section 4. Affiliates far away from the parent’s core
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Figure 3.7 – Core Investment Accounting for Productivity
business is likely to require specific assets and knowledge that the firm can only obtain by
sharing ownership. In these cases, the amount of collateral available is not likely to be the
important factor in determining ownership equity of the foreign affiliate.
Conclusion
This paper considers a different dimension to ownership equity of foreign affiliates. I find
that, on average, Japanese multinationals increase ownership equity in foreign affiliates
established subsequent a positive shock to their primary source of collateral. This is particularly
true when the foreign affiliate is established inside the core business of the parent. Japanese
multinationals increase ownership equity in core affiliates established subsequent a positive
shock to land value by approximately 4–8 percentage points. I find this to be statistically
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significant for foreign affiliates appearing in the data approximately a year following the shock
to land value.
A positive shock to land value does not appear to affect the ownership equity decision of
Japanese multinationals establishing non–core foreign affiliates. This may be due to the fact that
non–core affiliates are likely to require assets and knowledge that the parent does not possess
and can only obtain by sharing ownership. In this case how far away the affiliate is from the core
business of the parent is likely more important to ownership equity decisions than the level of
available collateral.
My results provide evidence of a relationship between collateral and ownership equity of
foreign affiliates. Further research is required in order to determine if similar results are observed
for the foreign affiliates of firms headquartered in countries other than Japan. In addition, I only
consider a demand side financial shock (collateral). Another avenue of future research is to
extend this concept to a supply side financial shock, such as bank health, as the relative response
of ownership equity to a financial shock may differ by the source or cause of the shock.
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CHAPTER IV
DOES THE EXCHANGE RATE MATTER FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT?
EVIDENCE FROM A GLOBAL VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is two–fold. First, a global macroeconomic empirical model is
used to re–examine the importance of the exchange rate for FDI. Second, the empirical model
will then shed light as to whether or not exchange rate movements are propagated around the
world through FDI. Exchange rate movements are often cited as an important factor for foreign
direct investment (FDI), in both the amount of investment and the allocation of investment
around the world. The commonly proposed intuition behind why the exchange rate should be a
factor in FDI is as follows.
Currently, there does not appear to be a strong consensus on the overall affect exchange
rate movements have on FDI around the world. Popular studies conducted by Froot and Stein
(1991), Klein and Rosengren (1994), and Blonigen (1997) suggest that FDI into the U.S. during
the mid 1970s to the early 1990s can, in part, be explained by a depreciation of the U.S. dollar.
Froot and Stein offer a popular theoretical argument for the importance of exchange rates in FDI
based upon imperfect capital markets. Multinational firms can borrow on the international
market in order to externally fund their FDI projects. However, lenders require compensation for
the greater monitoring cost associated with keeping tabs on their overseas investment. When
possible, firms would prefer to avoid this cost and fund their FDI project internally. Now
consider a movement in the exchange rate. A depreciation of a country’s currency improves the
internal wealth position of foreign firms relative to domestic firms. Foreign firms are
subsequently able to purchase assets in the country experiencing a currency depreciation at a
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lower cost relative to domestic firms. This results in more FDI flowing into the country
experiencing a currency depreciation.
However, Stevens (1993) suggests that the results of Froot and Stein are empirically
weak and there may not be a significant relationship between the exchange rates and FDI. Healy
and Palepu (1993) also suggests there is no relationship between exchange rates and FDI.
Evidence also exists showing that the relationship between exchange rates and FDI isn’t always
negative. Egger, Egger, and Ryan (2009) provide evidence that a strengthening of the U.S. dollar
reduced U.S. outbound FDI during the 1990s. Lui (2010) also provides evidence of a positive
relationship between exchange rates and FDI into China from 18 source countries during the
1990s and early 2000s.
Perhaps an intuitive counter–argument against the importance of exchange rate in FDI is
as follows. FDI projects have long time horizons. It’s reasonable to say that it takes considerable
time to plan and establish a foreign affiliate. It’s also reasonable to say that once a multinational
firm establishes a foreign affiliate in another country, they’re in it for the long haul.
Multinational firms should expect that the exchange rate between home and host country will
fluctuate over the lifetime of the foreign affiliate. Therefore, the exchange rate shouldn’t be a
critical factor to multinational firms engaging in FDI.
This paper re–examines the relationship between exchange rates and U.S. outbound FDI
to 8 regions around the world. A relatively new empirical technique, known as the global vector
autogression, is used to model the interactions between the exchange rate and FDI from a world–
wide macroeconomic aspect. There are several attractive properties of this approach. First, the
dynamics of the model can be studied via impulse response functions. This not only allows users
to see which direction U.S. FDI moves in response to a change in the exchange rate, but also
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how long the response lasts and its magnitude. Second, the model is truly global in nature. This
allows the user to consider many different host countries/regions for U.S. FDI around the world
within a single model. Third, the model allows for interactions and feedback between the
countries/regions of the model. This allows the user to examine whether or not changes in the
exchange rate in one country propagate to other countries/regions around the world through U.S.
FDI.
Results provide some evidence that a deprecation of a host country’s currency relative to
the U.S. causes a reduction in U.S. FDI received by the host country. This appears to be limited
region where the currency depreciation relative to the U.S. originates, suggesting that exchange
rate movements do not propagate through U.S. outbound FDI. However, the size of the reduction
in U.S. outbound FDI is very small. The actual effect over the course of a year is much smaller
than 1% of overall FDI received by the host countries in recent years. One can only conclude
that, in practical terms, exchange rates have no real economically meaningful impact on U.S.
outbound FDI.
Empirical Approach
The global vector autoregression (GVAR) model provides a feasible way to model
interactions in a global economy by providing a solution to the “curse of dimensionality”
problem typically associated with a global macroeconomic model. It was initially developed by
Pesaran, Shuermann, and Weiner (2004) in an effort to study losses suffered by major financial
institutions around the world following the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
In simple terms, a GVAR model can be described as a two–step procedure. The first step
entails estimating smaller country/region–specific models conditional on the rest of the world.
These models are essentially augmented standard VAR models, denoted as VARX* models.
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They showcase domestic variables augmented by weighted cross-section averages of weakly
exogenous foreign variables. The weighing procedure of the foreign variables is what makes the
model feasible to estimate. The second step of the GVAR procedure stacks the individual
VARX* models and solves them simultaneously as a single, large global VAR model.
The attractive quality of a GVAR model is that it truly allows the user to study the
transmission of shocks around the globe, making it useful to the area of international economics.
One can study the dynamics of how an economic event occurring in a source country, such as an
exchange rate movement, transmits to countries around the world. While conceptually simple, a
GVAR model is computationally demanding and usually involves large data sets. Fortunately, an
open source project known as the “GVAR Toolbox” has recently been developed by Smith and
Galesi (2014). The GVAR Toolbox allows users a straightforward way to build and estimate a
GVAR model via MATLAB.28
The GVAR model is estimated using quarterly data over the period 1995Q1–2015Q4 and
covers 23 countries in total.29 These countries comprised over 57% of world trade and over 65%
of world FDI in 2014.30
Table 4.1 – Countries and Regions in the GVAR Model
U.S.
Canada
Japan
U.K.
Switzerland
Scandinavia
-Denmark
-Norway
-Sweden

Euro Area
-Austria
-Belgium
-Finland
-France
-Germany
-Ireland
-Italy
-Netherlands
-Spain

28

Southeast Asia
-Hong Kong
-Korea
-Malaysia
-Singapore
Latin America
-Brazil
-Mexico

The GVAR Toolbox and its documentation is available at https://sites.google.com/site/gvarmodelling/
FDI data at a quarterly frequency is not available from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis prior to 1994.
30
These percentages were calculated using data available in the UNCTADstat, 2016 database.
29
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Since a GVAR model can quickly become computationally demanding, the 23 countries being
considered are grouped into the 9 different regions shown in bold in Table 4.1. The countries in
the sample belonging to the Euro area are easily considered a collective region as they share a
common currency beginning in 1999. Countries belonging to Scandinavia, Southeast Asia, and
Latin America seemed natural to consider as collective regions as well.
Data
Five variables are included in the GVAR model and are summarized in Table 4.2. With
the exception of FDI, all variables are expressed in terms of logarithms. The data for FDI
represents a quarterly flow and in some cases is negative. This indicates disinvestment and
precludes a log transformation. The log of real GDP (yit) for all countries was obtained from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. Data for Hong Kong, Malaysia, and
Singapore was only available in a non–seasonally adjusted format. Data for these three countries
were then seasonally adjusted using the R package seasonal, which employs the United States
Census Bureau’s X–13ARIMA–SEATS software for seasonal adjustment.31
Nominal exchange rate data vis-à-vis the US dollar was also obtained from the IFS
database for all countries. The nominal exchange rate for countries belonging to the euro area
prior to 1999Q1 was converted to the euro using the following method. The 1999Q1 value of the
euro exchange rate was used as the base value, which was then extrapolated backwards to
1995Q1 for each country using the quarterly percent change in its national currency exchange
rate. The euro exchange rate is used as the exchange rate for all countries in the sample
belonging to the euro area from 1999Q1 and onward. The consumer price index, also obtained

31

https://www.census.gov/srd/www/x13as/
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from the IFS database, was then used to convert nominal exchange rates into real exchange rates
and the logarithms subsequently taken (eit).
Table 4.2 – Variables Used in GVAR Model
Variable
Description
yit

Log of real GDP index of country i during
period t. Seasonally adjusted.

eit

Log of real exchange rate of country i during
period t. Defined as foreign currency per
U.S. dollar.

fdiit

iSit
iLit

U.S. foreign direct investment into country i
during period t. Defined in millions of US
dollars deflated by the U.S. consumer price
index.
Log of short–term nominal interest rate.
Defined as the money market interest rate.
Log of long–term nominal interest rate.
Defined as 10–year government bond
interest rate.

U.S. FDI abroad (fdiit) was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
database. Countries consistently reported on an individual basis in the BEA’s data over the
sample period was the primary factor in determining which countries would be included in the
GVAR model. Many countries not included in the model are reported by the BEA in a composite
category termed “other.” However, it difficult to determine exactly which countries make up the
BEA’s “other” categories in a given year. A secondary concern is data availability for
developing or emerging economies. Often data of sufficient quality or duration is problematic to
source for these countries, making it difficult to include them in the model. The BEA reports
U.S. FDI outflows in nominal terms, therefore the U.S. consumer price index was used to deflate
U.S. FDI outflows.32

32

Another variation used was U.S. FDI outflows divided by U.S. nominal GDP. Results were qualitatively
unchanged.
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The logarithm of the money market rate was used as the short–term nominal interest rate
(iSit). Data was primarily obtained from the IFS database. However, no data was available for
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and the Netherlands beginning in 1999Q1 following the
introduction of the euro. Therefore, to be consistent, the euro area money market interest rate
was obtained from the European Central Bank used for all euro area countries in the sample from
1999Q1 and onward. Norway was also incomplete in the IFS database. Data for Norway was
instead obtained from the Norwegian Central Bank (Norges Bank) for 1995Q1–2013Q4 and
from Oslo Børs from 2014Q1–2015Q4.33
Finally, the logarithm of the 10–year government bond yield was used as the long–term
nominal interest rate (iLit). Data was primarily obtained from the OECD Main Economic
Indicator database. OECD data for Mexico was incomplete and instead the 6–month to 2–year
government bond yield was obtained via the U.S. Federal Research Economic Database
(FRED).34 Data for Brazil, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore were also unavailable from the
OECD database. The long term interest rate published by the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco
Central do Brasil) was used for Brazil instead.35 A reliable source of data of sufficient duration
was unable to be obtained for Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore (SE Asia).
Trade and Aggregation Weights
Each of the country–specific models are comprised of both domestic variables and
weighted cross–section averages of foreign variables. These foreign variables are commonly
referred to as the “star” variables as a superscript asterisk is used to denote them. The weights for
these foreign variables are constructed using annual data on bilateral trade shares from 1995–

33

Oslo Børs took over the duties of publishing interest rates from Norges Bank at the end of 2013.
The 10–year bond yield for Mexico was unavailable prior to 2001.
35
Series code TJLP from the Central Bank of Brazil.
34
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2015 obtained from the United Nations COMTRADE database. A trade weight between
countries i and j is calculated as the sum of exports from i to j and imports from j to i divided by
the total amount of trade i conducts with all countries in the sample. The fixed trade weight
matrix in Table 4.3 is then constructed using the average trade weight over the period 1995–2015
such that each row sums to one.36
The trade weight matrix is responsible for linking together the countries and regions of
the model and illustrates the degree to which a country or region depends upon another. For
example, the U.S. and the U.K. have very similar shares in euro area trade and account for nearly
half (over 48%) of total euro area trade. The euro area accounts for over 58% of U.K. trade, with
the U.S. and the euro area combining to account for over 73% of U.K. trade. The euro area also
accounts for over 64% of trade in Scandinavia, with the U.K. and the euro area combining to
account for over 81% of Scandinavian trade. The simple message is that these countries are key
in the transmission of shocks in western Europe.
Individual countries are aggregated into the regions shown in Table 4.1 via the use of
weights constructed via purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP data obtained from the World Bank
International Comparison Program database. The weight is constructed by taking the PPP GDP
value of each country within a region and dividing by the total sum across that region, such that
the weights add up to one within the region. These weights are then used to aggregate groups of
countries together into a single region within the model. It should be noted that these aggregation
weights are not the same, or used for the same purpose, as the trade weights used in constructing
the foreign variables.

36

A time varying trade weight matrix, using a rolling 3–year average, was also used. Results remained robust.
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U.K.
0.0339
0.1076
0.2345
0
0.0316
0.0151
0.1692
0.0474
0.0473

Japan Latin America Scandinavia SE Asia
0.0317
0.0497
0.0124
0.0261
0.0281
0.0171
0.0168
0.0965
0.0639
0.0629
0.1450
0.0939
0.0254
0.0155
0.0822
0.0500
0
0.0489
0.0157
0.3341
0.0430
0
0.0092
0.0605
0.0206
0.0153
0
0.0418
0.2783
0.0518
0.0219
0
0.0920
0.2399
0.0158
0.1031

U.S.
0.7687
0.1128
0.2515
0.1495
0.3277
0.6750
0.0773
0.2958
0

Note: Trade weights are computed as shares of imports and exports displayed by rows such that a row, but not a column, sums to one. Source:
United Nations COMTRADE database, 1995–2015.

Country/Region Canada Switzerland Euro Area
Canada
0
0.0065
0.0710
Switzerland
0.0121
0
0.6091
Euro Area
0.0241
0.1242
0
U.K.
0.0290
0.0602
0.5881
Japan
0.0328
0.0202
0.1891
Latin America
0.0333
0.0097
0.1542
Scandinavia
0.0150
0.0144
0.6464
SE Asia
0.0217
0.0471
0.2360
U.S.
0.2620
0.0218
0.2182

Table 4.3 – Trade Weights

Unit Root Tests
The next step is to determine the integration order of the individual data series in the
model. Table 4.4 presents augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test statistics for the levels, first, and
second differences of the country/region–specific domestic and foreign variables. The lag length
employed by the ADF test was selected via the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with the lag
length restricted to be a maximum of 4.37 Note that no test statistics are available for domestic
exchange rates and FDI in the U.S. as the U.S. is the reference country for these variables in the
model. Also, no test statistics are available for the long–term interest rate in SE Asia as data for
this region was unavailable. As expected, the variables of the model are consistently I(1) in their
integration order. The only notable exception is the interest rate variables. Both the short and
long–term interest rate variables show mixed evidence of being I(1). However, more often than
not these variables are indicated by their test statistics to be I(1). Also, time plots of each of the
individual interest rate series display a downward trend over time for all countries over the
sample period. Therefore, to be consistent, all variables in the model are treated as I(1) and the
model is estimated in first differences.38
Country/Region–Specific Models
The same specification is not imposed across all country/region–specific models. The
model for the U.S. includes real GDP (yU.S.), the short–term nominal interest rate (iSU.S.), and the
long–term nominal interest rate (iLU.S.) as domestic variables. FDI and the real exchange rate are
not included as domestic variables in the U.S. model as the U.S. is the reference country for
these variables. The foreign real exchange rate (e*U.S.) and foreign FDI (fdi*U.S.) are included in
the U.S. model as foreign variables, implying that the value of the U.S. dollar and outward U.S.

37
38

Results are consistent when the lag length is restricted to maximum of 6.
Results are robust when the model is estimated treating interest rates as I(0).
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-4.16
-1.95

iS (with trend)

S

-3.45
-1.10
-5.21
-7.63
-1.83
-2.02

L

i (no trend)

ΔiL

Δ2iL
y* (with trend)
y* (no trend)

-7.75

i (with trend)

L

Δ2iS

Δi

S

-4.46

-9.59

Δ2fdi

i (no trend)

-7.32
-3.53
-2.77
-6.54

Δ2e
fdi (with trend)
fdi (no trend)
Δfdi

-8.11
-2.88
-1.59

-4.94

-1.92

-4.89

-7.08

-4.92

-3.08

-5.26

-9.64

-7.10
-3.02
-2.81
-7.10

-8.19
-2.15
-1.59

-2.66

-3.27

-4.02

-6.75

-6.31

-2.77

-5.39

-10.67

-8.25
-1.93
-2.10
-6.78

-7.71
-2.35
-2.26
-6.21

-7.78
-1.47
-1.41
-5.82

Δ2y
e (with trend)
e (no trend)
Δe
-10.59
-2.54
-2.54
-5.30

Canada Switzerland Euro Area
-1.73
-2.03
-3.00
-2.02
-0.99
-1.56
-4.86
-4.56
-4.26

Variables
y (with trend)
y (no trend)
Δy

-8.58
-2.63
-1.73

-4.60

0.03

-2.02

-4.45

-5.86

-1.91

-2.95

-8.03

-7.68
-2.85
-1.02
-9.88

-6.65
-3.38
-2.11
-6.22

-6.29
-2.38
-1.48

-3.47

-3.69

-4.34

-6.39

-4.08

-3.05

-3.75

-8.40

-7.51
-3.20
-2.57
-8.54

-6.88
-1.83
-1.86
-5.83

-5.58
-1.74
-1.98

-4.49

-3.05

-4.90

-8.66

-5.36

-4.14

-4.67

-7.18

-8.97
-1.42
-1.54
-8.05

-7.02
-1.63
-1.61
-5.68

-7.40
-3.03
-1.27

-3.96

-2.74

-3.38

-6.19

-4.54

-2.46

-4.05

-9.99

-7.97
-1.67
-1.06
-7.36

-5.12
-2.12
-1.83
-5.59

-2.30
-2.05

-

-

-

-8.61

-6.41

-1.97

-2.21

-7.43

-7.36
-4.25
-2.50
-6.84

-6.67
-3.01
-2.87
-4.03

-8.04
-1.71
-1.88

-6.97

-1.68

-2.71

-7.82

-5.21

-1.22

-2.82

-

-

-6.77
-

U.K. Japan Latin America Scandinavia SE Asia U.S.
-2.74 -1.69
-1.47
-1.73
-3.02 -1.72
-0.86 -2.32
-1.19
-2.32
-1.11 -1.89
-4.43 -4.07
-5.24
-2.43
-5.51 -4.27

Table 4.4 - ADF Unit Root Test Statistics
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-5.15
-8.01

-3.16
-2.32
-4.89

Δ2iS*

iL* (with trend)

L

i * (no trend)

ΔiL*
-5.68

-2.70

-4.09

-6.28

-6.13

-2.61

-5.23

-10.52

-8.28
-1.71
-1.61
-6.77

-4.87

-1.80

-4.11

-7.65

-5.12

-1.99

-4.76

-7.49

-8.17
-2.69
-1.04
-5.88

-5.70

-2.85

-4.18

-6.18

-5.98

-2.69

-5.40

-10.03

-8.22
-1.88
-1.91
-6.46

-6.99
-2.27
-2.18
-6.08

U.K.
-4.11

-6.56

-2.86

-3.63

-5.71

-5.09

-2.05

-3.94

-7.27

-7.73
-2.07
-1.75
-8.70

-6.65
-1.97
-1.98
-6.16

-6.98

-2.11

-2.92

-7.46

-4.63

-1.51

-3.03

-9.38

-8.15
-2.15
-1.80
-6.70

-6.73
-2.26
-2.14
-6.08

-5.75

-2.58

-3.96

-6.24

-5.95

-2.62

-5.29

-10.29

-8.26
-1.92
-1.66
-5.03

-7.31
-2.46
-2.25
-6.15

-3.75

-3.22

-4.21

-7.45

-4.73

-2.72

-4.45

-10.93

-8.18
-1.83
-1.72
-6.80

-5.99
-1.97
-1.88
-5.95

Japan Latin America Scandinavia SE Asia
-4.53
-4.50
-4.42
-4.07

-3.21

-2.49

-4.99

-7.07

-5.37

-3.28

-5.65

-9.31

-8.32
-2.77
-2.22
-6.54

-6.62
-1.73
-1.62
-5.47

U.S.
-5.21

Δ2iL*
-8.42
-8.11
-7.02
-8.17 -9.18
-8.65
-8.08
-7.35
-11.34
Note: Test statistics derived from univariate AR(p) models based on AIC order selection, with p ≤ 4, for the sample
period 1995Q1 - 2015Q4. The 95% critical value of the ADF statistic for regressions with a trend is -3.45 and -2.89 for
regressions without a trend.

S

Δi *

-3.14

iS* (with trend)
-1.72

-10.51

Δ2fdi*

iS* (no trend)

-8.52
-1.29
-1.51
-5.02

Δ2e*
fdi* (with trend)
fdi* (no trend)
Δfdi*

-7.07
-2.37
-2.12
-5.86

-6.94
-2.02
-1.90
-5.89

Δ2y*
e* (with trend)
e* (no trend)
Δe*
-7.23
-2.39
-2.25
-6.17

Canada Switzerland Euro Area
-3.42
-4.34
-4.31

Variables
Δy*

Table 4.4 - Continued

FDI are determined outside the U.S. model. No other foreign variables are included in the U.S.
due to its size and importance in the international economy. A similar argument has been used by
Pesaran, Shuermann, and Weiner (2004).
Canada, the U.K., Switzerland, the euro area, Scandinavia, Japan, and Latin America
include (yi, ei, fdii, iSi, iLi) as domestic variables and (y*i, iS*i, iL*i) as foreign variables in their
respective country/region–specific models. Notice, however, that not included is the real
exchange rate (e*i) and FDI (fdi*i) as foreign variables. This is because they have a close
relationship to their domestic counterparts due to their sharing of the same reference country
(U.S.) and have therefore been omitted. Lastly, SE Asia includes (yi, ei, fdii, iSi) as domestic
variables and (y*i, iS*i, iL*i) as foreign variables in its region–specific model. The difference from
above is that the long–term nominal interest rate is not included as a domestic variable as data
was not available.
Now that the variables to be included in each of the country/region–specific models have
been specified, the order of the individual country/region–specific VARX*(pi,qi) models is
determined. Note that pi refers to the lag length of the domestic variables in the model for
country/region i, and qi refers to the lag length of the foreign variables. The lag length of the
domestic and foreign variables in a country/region–specific VARX* model need not be the same.
Order selection was performed via the Akaike information criterion (AIC) where both pi and qi
were restricted to be no more than 4. Order selection of the VARX*(pi,qi) models is summarized
in Table 4.5.39
Cointegration is also considered. The number of cointegrating relationships present in
each of the country/region–specific VARX* models is also summarized in Table 4.5. Johansen’s

39

A better performing, stable, specification was not found.
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Table 4.5 – VARX* Order and Number of Cointegrating
Relationships in Individual Models
VARX*(p,q)
Country
p
q
Canada
1
1
Switzerland
3
3
Euro Area
3
3
U.K.
3
4
Japan
4
4
Latin America
4
3
Scandinavia
4
4
SE Asia
4
2
U.S.
1
1

# Cointegrating
Relationships
5
4
3
3
4
3
1
4
2

Note: VARX*(pi,qi) is based on AIC order selection with p ≤ 4
and q ≤ 4.

trace statistics, described in Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2000), are used to determine the rank of
the cointegrating space. Unrestricted constants and restricted trend coefficients are included in
the individual country/region error correction VARX* models. The number of cointegrating
relationships summarized in Table 4.5 follow from the trace statistics shown in Table 4.6.
Weak Exogeneity and Residual Serial Correlation
One of the main assumptions of a GVAR model is that the foreign variables present in
each of the country/region–specific VARX* models are weakly exogenous. Therefore, a formal
test must be conducted to ensure this requirement is satisfied. The weak exogeniety assumption,
à la Johansen (1992) and Granger and Lin (1995), in the context of cointegrating models implies
there is no long–run feedback from the domestic variables to the foreign variables, without ruling
out feedback in the short–run between the two variable sets. This involves testing the joint
significance of the estimated error correction terms in auxiliary equations for the country/region–
specific foreign variables, as described in Johansen (1992) and Harbo, Johansen, Nielsen and
Rahbek (1998). The lag orders for the test were chosen to be the same as the underlying VARX*
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Country Canada Switzerland Euro Area U.K.
Japan Latin America Scandinavia 95% Critical Value
r=0
285.98
235.38
273.18
231.83 201.14
195.74
140.05
122.96
r=1
204.24
139.38
156.41
146.21 136.42
122.48
91.58
91.81
r=2
135.02
81.28
88.54
84.19 82.42
78.20
54.64
64.54
r=3
79.88
42.51
41.28
36.83 44.09
37.90
23.73
41.03
r=4
33.44
15.11
15.14
11.60 12.21
10.37
9.36
20.98

Table 4.6 - Cointegration Trace Statistics

Table 4.6 - Continued
Country
r=0
r=1
r=2
r=3

SE Asia
179.76
108.38
54.72
24.39

95% Critical Value
91.81
64.54
41.03
20.98

U.S.
117.85
54.71
15.80

95% Critical Value
57.45
36.09
18.26

Note: Critical values obtained from Mackinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999) at the 5% significance level. Canada,
Switzerland, the Euro area, the U.K., Japan, Latin America, and Scandinavia include 5 domestic variables and 3
foreign variables. SE Asia includes 4 domestic variables and 3 foreign variables. The U.S. includes 3 domestic
variables and 2 foreign variables.

models.40 Results are shown in Table 4.7. The null hypothesis that the foreign variables are
weakly exogenous is unable to be rejected in all cases. This suggests that the assumption of weak
exogneity is satisfied.
Table 4.7 – F Statistics for Weak Exogeneity of the Country/Region–Specific
Foreign Variables
Country
Canada
Switzerland
Euro Area
U.K.
Japan
Latin America
Scandinavia
SE Asia
U.S.

y*
2.02
0.48
0.08
1.99
0.76
0.10
1.56
0.48
-

F(5,64)
F(4,47)
F(3,48)
F(3,44)
F(4,38)
F(3,42)
F(1,41)
F(4,48)
F(2,70)

e*
0.03

fdi*
0.27

iS*
0.68
1.56
0.22
0.49
0.34
0.88
2.19
0.18
-

iL*
0.90
0.44
1.24
0.15
0.31
0.91
0.11
0.98
-

Note: * denotes statistical significace at the 5% level. Null hypothesis: foreign variables
are weakly exogenous. Tests were carried out using lag orders of the underlying
VARX* models shown in Table 4.5.

Finally, tests are performed to check for serial correlation in the residuals of the each of
the country/region–specific VARX* models. This provides insight into how well the model
specification is performing. Table 4.8 presents results for the F statistic version of the familiar

40

This does not have to be the case. Results using AIC to select lag orders did not alter the test results in any
meaningful way.
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LM test for serial correlation.41 It is comforting to see that the model specification performs
rather well; only 3 out of 42 cases reject the null hypothesis of there being no serial correlation of
the residuals. In fact, several model specifications were tried, but a better performing, stable
specification was not found.
Table 4.8 - F Statisitics for Tests of Residual Serial Correlation for the
Country/Region–Specific Regressions
Canada
Switzerland
Euro Area
U.K.
Japan
Latin America
Scandinavia
SE Asia
U.S.

F(4,66)
F(4,51)
F(4,52)
F(4,49)
F(4,43)
F(4,47)
F(4,46)
F(4,52)
F(4,70)

y
0.6
1.66
1.82
0.54
0.19
1.18
4.44*
0.82
2.59*

e
0.49
1.32
1.94
1.5
0.24
0.45
0.43
0.67
-

fdi
1.51
0.92
0.7
0.81
0.8
0.9
1.14
0.15
-

iS
0.05
1.49
2.58*
0.86
0.42
0.42
0.28
0.55
0.43

iL
1.83
0.88
1.45
0.96
0.92
1.46
0.4
1.06

Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. Null hypothesis: residuals are not
serially correlated.

Dynamic Properties of the Model and Discussion
The dynamic properties of how a currency depreciation of a particular country or region,
vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, affects outgoing U.S. FDI across the globe are studied via generalized
impulse response functions (GIRFs). Literature on GVAR models has primarily adopted the
GIRF approach to deriving impulse response functions as it produces the same results regardless
of the ordering of the countries and variables in the model.42 This is primarily because a
particular ordering would be hard to entertain or justify in the context of a global model and the
use of a priori restrictions on long–run properties of the model à la Blanchard and Quah (1989)
can be complicated due to the high dimensionality and cross sectional interactions of the model.

41
42

See Godfrey 1978a, 1978b.
See, for example, Pesaran et al. (2004), Pesaran and Smith (2006), and Dées et al. (2007).
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While the model allows for the possibility of an exchange rate shock originating in any of
countries or regions of the model, with the exception of the U.S., only three countries/regions
will be considered to keep analysis focused. These are:
-

A positive, 1 standard deviation shock (1.26% increase) to U.K./U.S. real exchange rate.

-

A positive, 1 standard deviation shock (1.27% increase) to euro/U.S. real exchange rate.

-

A positive, 1 standard deviation shock (1.19% increase) to Scandinavia/U.S. real
exchange rate.

These three shocks represent a strengthening of the U.S. dollar relative to the U.K., euro area,
and Scandinavia.
Figure 4.1 displays the impact an increase in the U.K. real exchange rate has on U.S. FDI
worldwide. Results show that an increase in the U.K. real exchange rate decreases U.S. FDI into
the U.K. and also the euro area. For the U.K., there is a statistically significant reduction in U.S.
FDI amounting to more than $713,000 in the quarter following a real exchange rate shock. This
result is consistently statistically significant seven quarters following the shock and often greater
than a $500,000 reduction per quarter. For the euro area, there is a statically significant reduction
in U.S. FDI amounting to more than $190,000 in the second quarter following a real exchange
rate shock. This becomes statistically significant in a consistent manner five quarters following
the shock and is consistently larger than $110,000 per quarter. The U.K. exchange rate does not
appear to affect U.S. FDI in other countries/regions of the world.
Figure 4.2 displays the impact an increase in the euro area real exchange rate has on U.S.
FDI worldwide. Results show that an increase in the euro area real exchange rate decreases U.S.
FDI into the U.K. and the euro area. The euro area real exchange rate shock results in a
statistically significant reduction of U.S. FDI into the U.K. that amounts to more than $283,000
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Figure 4.1 – Impulse Response of Shock to U.K. Real Exchange Rate 43

43

Confidence bounds (95%) were obtained via 1000 bootstrap replications.
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in the quarter following a shock. However, this quickly dissipates and is statistically insignificant
after two or more quarters. The euro area experiences a statistically significant reduction in U.S.
FDI two quarters after a shock to the euro area real exchange rate. This reduction peaks at over
$430,000 in the third quarter following a shock and is consistently more than a $200,000
reduction in the quarters that follow. U.S. FDI into other countries and regions do not appear to
respond to a change in the euro area exchange rate.
Figure 4.3 displays the impact an increase in the Scandinavian exchange rate has on U.S.
FDI worldwide. Results show that positive shock to the Scandinavian real exchange rate does not
have an impact on U.S. FDI into Scandinavia, but does have an impact on U.S FDI into the euro
area. A plausible explanation for this is simply that the amount of U.S. FDI into Scandinavia is
relatively small. During 2014 the U.S. accounted for about 6.7% of total FDI received by
Sweden, 8.2% of total FDI received by Norway, and 2.7% of FDI received by Denmark. 44
However, as shown by Table 4.3, Scandinavia and the euro area share a strong trade
relationship. This may explain why a Scandinavian exchange rate shock propagates to the euro
area, resulting in decreased U.S. FDI. A positive shock to the real Scandinavian exchange rate
results in a reduction in U.S. FDI into the euro area that is statistically significant after two or
more quarters. The amount of the reduction peaks at over $145,000 in the third quarter follow a
shock, and is consistently more than $100,000 in following quarters.
Several discussion points arise from these results. First, U.S. outbound FDI declines in
response to an appreciation of the U.S. dollar. This runs counter to what is implied by, for
example, Klein and Rosengren (1994). It does, however, tend to agree with Egger, Egger, and
Ryan (2009) and Lui (2010). Egger, Egger, and Ryan (2010) show that a result such as this is

44

Calculations based on data obtained from OECD International direct investment database, 2016.
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Figure 4.2 – Impulse Response of Shock to Euro Area Real Exchange R ate
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theoretically possible. They suggest that countries with a relatively heavier orientation towards
foreign affiliate production versus exporting, such as the U.S., reduce outbound FDI as their
home currency appreciates. The results of this paper appear to lend additional support to this.
Second, exchange rate movements do not appear to propagate through FDI. In other
words, U.S. FDI doesn’t appear to be affected outside of the immediate area where the exchange
rate shock originates. For example, a shock to the real exchange rate originating in the euro area
does not have an appreciable affect to U.S. FDI into Japan, southeast Asia, and Latin America.
Also, U.S. FDI into areas relatively close to the euro area geographically, such as such as
Switzerland and Scandinavia, does not appear affected as well. Additionally, while not one of the
three shocks of focus in this section, results also indicate that U.S. FDI does not respond to an
appreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis Japan or southeast Asia. Overall, there is little evidence
that a depreciation of one region’s currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar has any impact on U.S.
outbound FDI into other regions.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the magnitudes of these responses are very small.
Using Figure 4.1 as an example, the potential drop in U.S. FDI into the U.K. following a
deprectiation of the British pound relative to the U.S. dollar totals, approximately, $2,585,939.45
This number is relatively small considering this is at the macroeconomic level. To put this in
perspective, according to UNCTAD’s 2016 World Investment Report the overall amount of FDI
received by the U.K. from the rest of the world during 2015 was over 39 billion dollars. This
means the total reduction in U.S. FDI received by the U.K. following an approximate 1.3%
increase in the U.K./U.S. real exchange rate amounts to far, far less than 1% of total FDI
received by the U.K.

45

After two years the drop in U.S. FDI in the U.K. is approximately $4,780,861.
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Figure 4.3 – Impulse Response of Shock to Scandinavian Real Exchange Rate
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in 2015. Not only that, but the magnitude of the responses in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 are generally
even smaller.
These results call into question the real world impact exchange rates actually have on
U.S. outward FDI. Yes, in some cases it appears exchange rate movements have a statistically
significant impact on the amount of outward FDI. However, the size of the impact experienced
by the receiving country is very, very small relative to the overall amount of FDI received. One
can only conclude that exchange rates do not appear to have any economically meaningful
impact upon U.S. outbound FDI at the macroeconomic level.
Conclusion
This paper re–examines how exchange rate movements affect FDI using a GVAR model,
a relatively new empirical technique to modeling interactions in a global economy. Quarterly
U.S. outbound FDI into 22 countries making up 8 different regions is considered over the period
1995–2015. Results provide some evidence that a deprecation of a host country’s currency
relative to the U.S. causes a reduction in U.S. FDI received by the host country. This appears to
be limited to the immediate region of the country experiencing a currency depreciation. In other
words, exchange rate movements do not appear to propagates to other parts of the world through
U.S. outbound FDI.
However, and more importantly, these results do not appear to be economically
significant. The total reduction in U.S. FDI received by host countries amounts to much less than
1% of overall FDI received by the host countries in recent years. One is lead to conclude that
exchange rates do not play any economically meaningful role in U.S. outbound FDI. The long
time horizon associated with FDI projects suggests that multinational firms should expect
exchange rates to fluctuate during the life of the project. Intuition then suggests that exchange
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rates should not play a major role in determining FDI behavior. The results of this paper provide
evidence as to the plausibility of this argument.

72

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This three–essay dissertation makes three important contributions to the literature on FDI
and its relationship with collateral and the exchange rate. First, I show how the value of pledged
collateral varies with a firm’s productivity level. Second, I demonstrate how collateral affected
the amount of ownership equity Japanese parent firms place in their foreign affiliates. Third, I
illustrate that not only did an appreciation of the U.S. dollar have no economically meaningful
impact on U.S. FDI outflows, but also that exchange rate movements do not appear to spread
through U.S. outbound FDI to other parts of the world as well.

My first contribution follows from a theoretical model I developed illustrating that more
productive firms are able to pledge a smaller amount of collateral relative to less productive
firms for FDI projects requiring the same amount of external financing. Intuitively, more
productive firms are safer investments in the eyes of lenders as their FDI projects are more likely
to succeed relative to less productive firms. This grants more productive firms the ability to
pledge less collateral relative to their less productive counterparts. Additionally, firms with a
productivity level below a set threshold level need to pledge collateral of greater value than the
amount borrowed. This may not be a feasible option for firms facing this situation and cause
them to instead forego the FDI project.
I empirically examine the relationship between pledged collateral and productivity using
firm–level data on Japanese FDI into the U.S. between 1980 and 2000. My results support an
inverse relationship between productivity and pledged collateral implied by my theoretical
model. My results are the strongest for 1991–2000, the period that followed the burst of Japan’s
asset bubble and subsequent collapse of its banking system, which limited the access Japanese
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firms had to external financing. My results suggest that the productivity level of a firm is
important in determining the amount of collateral pledged to secure external financing during a
time of financial crisis. A plausible explanation is that in the eyes of lenders more productive
firms are more likely to be successful with their FDI projects, reducing the likelihood of default.
This allows more productive firms to secure external financing with less collateral relative to less
productive firms.
Several avenues exist for future research on this topic. My theoretical model can be
extended to be sequential in nature. Often firms begin servicing a foreign market by first
exporting before making the switch to FDI. Currently, my model only focuses on the FDI
decision made by firms. However, it would be straightforward to extend the model to include the
possibility of exporting as well. Including this option in the model may show that firms not
meeting the productivity level cutoff necessary for their FDI project to be feasible have the
option of exporting instead. Another avenue of future research concerns data on collateral
pledged by firms. Currently I construct a proxy for a firm’s pledged collateral using available
balance sheet data. Research moving forward should focus on developing a more accurate way
of measuring or estimating pledged collateral.
My second contribution follows from the analysis of impulse response functions for
Japanese foreign direct investment into 12 OECD countries from 1975 to 2000. Domestically–
held land is a traditional form of collateral in Japan’s culture of corporate finance. A positive
shock to land value increased ownership equity in foreign affiliates belonging to the same 2–digit
standard industrial classification as their Japanese parent by approximately 4–8 percentage
points. Ownership equity in foreign affiliates outside the 2–digit standard industrial classification
of their Japanese parent does not appear to be affected by a positive land value shock. This may
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be due to the fact that non–core affiliates are likely to require assets and knowledge that the
parent may not possess but can easily obtain through shared ownership of the foreign affiliate.
However, it is important to keep in mind that these results are based on an interesting
time period of Japan’s history. Land prices surged during the late 1980s, resulting in a large land
price bubble which subsequently collapsed during the early 1990s. Land prices lost
approximately half their value during the 1990s, sending Japan into financial crisis. Future
research on this topic should consider the foreign affiliates of firms headquartered in countries
other than Japan to see if these results are applicable to other countries as well. In addition, I
only consider a demand side financial shock, collateral. Another avenue of future research is to
extend this concept to a supply side financial shock, such as bank health, as the relative response
of ownership equity to a financial shock may differ by the source or cause of the shock.
My third contribution follows from the use of a relatively new empirical technique
known as global vector autoregression (GVAR) to model the interactions between the real
exchange rate and U.S. outward FDI. My results indicate evidence of a statistical relationship
between U.S. FDI outflow and a strengthening of the U.S. dollar. However, my results also
indicate that an appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative one country or economic region does not
appear to affect U.S. FDI outflow to other parts of the world. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the actual size of the effect on U.S. FDI outflow is very small; amounting to much
less than 1% of overall FDI received by host countries and economic regions in the model for
recent years. I conclude that not only did an appreciation of the U.S. dollar have no economically
meaningful impact on U.S. FDI outflows during this period, but also that exchange rate
movements do not appear to spread through U.S. outbound FDI to other parts of the world as
well.
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Future research may consider outbound FDI from different source countries. For
example, Japan is a popular candidate based on the observed increase in Japanese FDI into the
U.S. during the 1980’s while the U.S. dollar was simultaneously depreciating. However, I
believe future research should be more concerned with the possibility of new empirical
applications of GVAR modeling. A GVAR model considers the feedback and interactions
between many different host countries and economic regions around the world within a single
model. I believe these to be attractive properties when considering something as global in nature
as FDI. For example, one possible future application of GVAR modeling to FDI could be to
follows. Literature has shown that a reduction of Japanese FDI into the U.S. during the 1990s
can in part be explained by reduced access to credit resulting from Japan’s financial crisis of the
1990s.46 But was this reduction in Japanese FDI into the U.S. relatively uniform across the
country, or confined to a particular region? To answer this question, a GVAR model could be
used to analyze changes in the regional patterns of Japanese FDI into the U.S. resulting from a
financial crisis in Japan.

46

See Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002).
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APPENDICES
A.1 – Foreign affiliate Price and Output Relative to the Domestic Case
Domestic firms charge a price given by pD =
given by pFDI =

σ
1
( ).
(σ-1) λβ

σ
1
( )
(σ-1) β

while foreign affiliates charge a price

The price charged by foreign affiliates differs from the domestic case

1

by markup factor λ > 1 since λϵ(0,1). This illustrates that foreign affiliates charge a higher price.
Due to the fact that output in both cases is decreasing in price, this implies that output of the
foreign affiliate is lower relative to the domestic case.
A.2 – Proof of Proposition 1
∂γ*
∂φ

=

1
(1-λ)

(1-λ) is positive since λϵ(0,1), thus
∂γ
∂β

A λ

σ

1

= - (σ-1) β (1-λ) [(σ-1) ( λβ )]

∂γ
∂φ

>0

1-σ

Note that (σ-1) > 0 as σ > 1 and (1-λ) > 0 as λϵ(0,1), thus
Signing

∂γ*
∂λ

∂γ
∂β

<0

is analytically difficult. Instead, equation (11) is plotted to examine how pledged

collateral changes as the probability of success increases. Plot 1 depicts how pledged collateral
changes as the probability of success increases, assuming the amount borrowed is less than the
total market size. Pledged collateral is initially increasing but then becomes decreasing as the
probably of success increases. However, as depicted in Plots 2 and 3, when the amount borrowed
is equal to or greater than the total market size pledged collateral is unambiguously increasing in
the probability of success.
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Plot 1

Plot 2
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Plot 3

A.3 – Proof of Proposition 3
1

A 1-σ 1
*
(
∂β
φ) λ A
=
[ln - 1]
(σ-1)2
∂σ
φ
The sign of

∂β*
∂σ

A

hinges upon ln ( φ ) where

∂β*
∂σ

A

> 0 if ( φ ) > e. This implies that

A

φ < (e)
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∂β*
∂σ

> 0 when
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